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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
This series of collected articles Is published by the 
Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
First of all, It Is meant to be a forum where documents of 
work done by the members of this Institute will become acces­
sible with the shortest possible delay but, naturally, prod­
ucts from other cooperating philosophical institutions are 
also welcome.
The four nouns listed on the cover of each number in­
dicate our main research profiles. Much of what we write is 
on social philosophy, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy 
and history of science, and the history and theory of religion. 
We hope to serve both a Hungarian and an international public, 
therefore the languages of the articles will vary from number 
to number, as best suited to their respective themes. Transla­
tions of the contents of back issues will be regularly found 
on the last page. If readers show interest in one or another 
title which has appeared, say, in Hungarian, we shall be 
pleased to reprint the text in the language required.
This is just one sign of our intention to enter into 
close contacts and collaboration with those who take interest 
in DOXA. We are also awaiting any response, suggestion or 
contribution which may arrive from scholars the world over, 
this country included. Our work would be greatly facilitated 
and, indeed, rewarded by such initiative.
Coypright in each case rests with the authors, the only 
compensation they receive being free copies or offprints on 
request. To obtain permission to reprint individual articles, 
or for any ether information, please write to the author con­
cerned, on the address of this Institute:
S
MTA Filozófiai Intézet - DOXA 
1054 Budapest, Szemere u. 10 
Hungary
For the same reason, future contributors are requested to 
supply information on themselves (address, title, post held, 
etc.).
The first number of DOXA was published in Hungarian.
The second number, which is here being introduced, is our 
first venture in English. Its publication coincides with the 
5th Joint International Conference on History and Philosophy 
of Science (IUHPS) held at the Hungarian town of Veszprém, 
14th to 20th August, 1984. This has been a unique opportunity 
to select our material from the latest products of those phil­
osophers , logicians and historians of science who are somehow 
associated with this Institute. Our selection is, of course, 
far from being representative of all the important work done 
in Hungary on the themes mentioned, even though we have tried 
to extend our capacity and have devoted DOXA 3 to the same 
cause, which appears simultaneously. In our efforts, we were 
greatly helped by the Postgraduate Training and Information 
Centre of Loránd Eötvös University, Budapest, particularly 
from its Committee for the History, Logic and Philosophy of 
Science.
Many thanks are due to all those who have generously 
contributed their articles and have helped us in every way to 
compile this two-volume survey, however fragmentary, of Hun­
garian philosophy of science. Thanks to them, we are now able 
to greet the readers of our first two numbers in English, 
among them especially the IUHPS Conference participants, who 
will be the first to take DOXA 2 and 3 in their hands.
LÁSZLÓ hars ing
OUTLINE OF A LOGIC OF RELATIVE TRUTH
1. Relative Truth ae the Generalieation of the Clae- 
eioal Truth Concept
Scientific research is justly considered to be the most 
reliable cognitive method, for it is the best way of enrich­
ing human knowledge with new and true knowledge. Truth is the 
central value category of science. However, the concept of 
truth can only serve its axiological purpose in science if it 
also accounts for the truth status of hypotheses which are 
decisively important from the point of view of the progress 
of cognition.
If truth is interpreted in the classical sense as the 
congruence of thought and reality, then truth value can only 
be attributed to hypotheses in a definitional sense, at best, 
and, in most cases, not in a criterial sense, since compari­
son with reality cannot always be made. He could say that 
hypotheses have no truth value at all, as they are partly 
propositions referring to non-existent (past or future) phe­
nomena. However, this regressive solution must be rejected 
unless we wish to challenge the validity of the truth multi­
plying function of science. We will therefore assume that the 
deterministic relationship of the present with the past and 
the future provides a sufficient basis for interpreting the 
concept of congruence.
Another suggested solution to the problem acknowledges 
that hypotheses have truth value in a classical sense but, 
without an adequate operative method, this cannot be defined. 
Instead, the introduction of the concept of logical probabil-
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itv Is suggested, which measures the degree of grounding the 
hypotheses have. This proposition has a positive element, in 
that hypotheses, from the point of view of their cognitive 
status, can only be evaluated through comparison with other 
statements. If a hypothesis shows agreement with a background 
of knowledge which has already been accepted, then it is at­
tributed a probability factor above minimum; if, on the other 
hand, it lacks agreement, a probability factor under minimum 
is attributed to it. Given the knowledge of logical probabil­
ities, hypotheses can be compared, and, in addition, measure 
functions assuring quantification can also be defined. How­
ever, from an epistemological point of view, this solution is 
not satisfactory, either. Its primary inadequacy is that it 
considers truth to be an epistemological noumenon (thing in 
itself), the existence of which we presume, while denying its 
cognlzabillty.
A possible egression can be found in the proposition 
which interprets logical probability as the probability of 
the truth of the hypotheses, i.e. it takes it as the degree 
to which the truth of the given hypothesis is grounded. He 
can argue as follows: let us suppose that previous knowledge 
has a relevant part which is true in the classical sense.
This knowledge is generally acquired as an Intellectual in­
heritance from former generations. The hypothesis set up as 
possible new knowledge must be compatible with this relevant 
part. This compatibility assures indirect correspondance be­
tween the hypothesis and the facts of reality, the degree of 
compatibility being denoted by logical probability. This 
epistemological form of indirection is of such great impor­
tance from the point of view of gathering knowledge that no 
truth concept of any philosophical significance can disregard 
it.
For all that, our suggestion here is to accept relativ 
truth as the measure of value of the hypotheses, instead of 
logical probability. To support our proposition, we put for-
8
ward the following arguments:
a/ The concept of relative truth not only emphasizes the in­
directness of the truth of hypotheses, but the historical 
character of this indirectness as well. It takes into ac­
count the fact that cognitive processes comprise a succes­
sion of situations and, in any of these situations, the 
relative truth value may alter, 
b/ Over and above the historical indirectness of that corre­
spondence, the concept of relative truth also i underlines the 
momentum of self-reflection. When we talk about the relative 
truth value of a certain statement, we are not thinking 
of some Independently existing epistemological indirectness 
but, rather, we are stressing its coming to be known by 
some cognitive subject. This cognitive subject is consid­
ered to be an ideal individual who is in possession of all 
historically possible relevant knowledge and performs his 
cognitive activities as a representative of the human race, 
c/ Nevertheless, his relative truth value judgement may be 
false, because it is also possible that the hypotheses is 
false in the classical sense. This can occur in spite of 
the fact that it has been in agreement with relevant human 
knowledge so far, and it is attributed a high relative truth 
value.
d/ Relative truth value, as indirect and historical knowledge 
composed of the classical truth value, does not supersede 
the concept of the classical truth value, but serves as a 
cognitive index for the latter.
e/ When we determine the long-term goal of scientific research 
in the acquisition of new and true knowledge, we must nec­
essarily think of relative truth values, since knowledge 
can be considered as new truth only in a historical sense, 
f/ Using the relative truth concept as a basis, it is possible 
to elaborate a logical system which will, in turn, enable 
us to develop a theory of reasoning far more differentiated 
than classical logic. Thus, it seems justified to regard
9
relative truth as a generalization of the classical truth 
concept.
2. Structure of the Logic of Relative Truth (VL)
The well-formed formulas of VL are the following:
(i) An atomic V-formula is every formula of classical 
propositional logic (CL) which is preceded by one and only one 
of the letters V, V^ , V2, ... (simple ^-expression) and is 
followed by one of the signs =,<,>, or by an intelligible com­
bination of them, the latter being followed by a rational num­
ber belonging to interval (0,1), or by a simple V-expression.
(ii) A molecular V-formula is obtained if the simple l'­
expression of any atomic V-formula is substituted by at least 
two simple V-expressions combined with the arithmetic symbols 
+,-, and /.
(lii) A well-formed V-formula is eynchronic if the letter 
V in it appears without an index. A diachronic V-formula is 
obtained when the indexes of the letters V are identical or 
consecutive natural numbers. Each well-formed V-formula is 
either a synchronic or diachronic formula.
Synchronic axioms:
Al. 0 < V(p> < 1
A2. V(~p) = 1 - V(p)
A3. V(p i q) = V(p)V(q)
A4. V(p) : V(p % q) + V(p t ~ q )
Diachronic axioms:
AS. vx(p S q) < Vx(p) V2(<7), if 1 > V2(p) > Vx(p)
A6. V p * q) = Vx(p) V2(g), if V2(p) ■= 1.
Synchronic axioms specify one single cognitive situation.
and, accordingly, truth values occurring in these are con;-
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stant. On the other hand, diachronic axioms reckon with the 
fact that truth values in a new, cognitive situation are dif­
ferent (due to the extension of the background of knowledge), 
and they thus indicate the relationship between two consec­
utive, cognitive situations. As we shall see, in most cases, 
the verification or refutation of the hypotheses is based on 
diachronic argumentation.
Here are some synchronic theorems which are either di­
rect consequences of the axioms, or can be easily accepted on 
the grounds of the previous theorems.
Tl. Vip t ~p) a Y(p) - P(p)2
Self-constradiction in VI is not false in all cases (that 
is to say, it is not identically false), since in the case of
0 < F(p) < 1, Yip I ~p) > 0. Yet, in those cases where
F(p) = 1  or V(p) « 0, we come to the analogue of CL, namely 
to V(p * -p) “ O.
T2. F(p v q) = F(p) * F(~p i q )
T3. V(p v~p) = F(~p) * F(p)2
In VL the theorem known as the "excluded middle" is al­
ways a true formula (it is not identically true), since, in 
the case of 0 < F(p) < 1, F(p i ~p) < 1, but in the cases of
1 and 0 we come to the analogue of PL.
T4.
T5.
F(p
F(p
» p) = F(p)2 
i p ) «  2F(p) - F(p)2
T6. V(P => q ) * F(“p ) + P(p i q)
T7. If F(p=g) = 1, then F(p) £ V(q)
T8. If ftps q) “ 1, then V(p) = V(p t q)
The majority of diachronic theorems can also be easily 
acknowledged.
T9. Kjip i~p) = Fx(p) = V^pW^p) , if 1 > V2(p)V1(p)
The value of Fj(p i -p) is 0 only in the case of V^p) = 0, 
or when VjCp) ■ 1 .
U
T10. F^p S p) s F1(p)K2(p), if 1 > V2(p) > Vx(p) 
Tll. Vx(p v <7) *= Vj^p) + V ^ p  ( q)
T12. P^p v ~p) > Fx(-p) + V1(p)V2<.p), If 1 > V2(p) > P^p) 
T13. Vx(p v p) > Vx(p) + V1(~p)F2(p), if 1 > F2(p) > F^ (p)
T14. F^(p a p) *■ P^(~p) + F^(p S g) .
In fact, the diachronic character becomes especially 
prominent when V^(p t q), V^-p & q) and F-expressions sim­
ilar to these occurring in the F-formulas are developed ac­
cording to AS or A6. If none of the mentioned F-formulas ap­
pears in a synchronic F-formula, or if one occurs but is not 
developed according to AS or A6, then it can be easily tran­
scribed into a diachronic form so that each F is provided 
with an identical index.
T15. If a/ F^(p = q) - 1 and b / Fj(q) « 1, then 
F2(p) - F^p) /Fx(q)
The thesis can be proved as follows:
from T8 and a/ consequently V^p) «* V ^ p  s q) .
b/ enables us to apply A6: Fjip) « F^(g)F2(p)
Thus, the thesis can be derived directly.
T16. If a/ V ^ p s q )  ■= 1, b/ V^p) > V^qjV^r) and 
c l V2(r) - 1, then V2(p) > V^q) .
Proof:
it follows from premise b/ that (1) Vj(p)/V^(r) > V^q)
According to a/ and c/, T15 is (2) V2(p) - Vjtpj/Vjir) .
From (1) and (2), Vj(p) > V^q) .
3. Examples of Synchronie and Diachronic Reasoning
The analogue of every single inferential procedure dealt 
with in CL can be constituted in PL. From these, let us con­
sider a variant of the so-called destructive dilemma:
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51. a/ P(p sq) ■ 1 
b / P(p => r) = 1 
c/ P(g t r) - 0
P(p) - 0
Proof: on the basis of a/ and b/ and T7, P(p) < Viq) and 
/(p) £ P(r). According to c/ and A3, from P(q) and KCr) at 
least one equals 0. Hence V(p) « 0.
However, it is possible to justify a good number of 
reasoning procedures, the analogues of which cannot be formu­
lated in CL. Let us mention a weak version of modus ponens:
52. a/ V(paq) > 0 
b/ 7(p) «= 1
P(q) > 0 .
Proof: from a/ and T6, P(~p) + V(p t q) > 0 . Since following 
from b/, P(-p) = 0 and F(p & q) - P(p)V(q), thus P(q) > 0.
Yet, from the point of view of those sciences where em­
pirical information is also used as premise, and the verifi­
cation and refutation of hypotheses is considered to be their 
primary task, it is diachronic reasoning which is really 
important. Below, we will deal with the so-called inverse modue 
ponene or confirmative reasoning and with analogical argumen­
tation. These methods of reasoning are emphatically important 
in the field of factual sciences, and we advance the opinion 
that the only logic which will play a part in the methodology 
of these sciences is the one which can account for these 
methods.
Dl. a/ =>q) » 1
b / ^(p) > 0
cl ^(q) < 1
d / r2(q) - 1
P2(p) > ^(p)
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Proof: by virtue of a/ and T8, Pj^p) « ^ ( p  * q). According 
to b/, d/ and A6, 0 < Fj^p) - ^(qjPjtp). Since In compli­
ance with b / and cl, 0 < F^q) < 1, thus Fj(p) > F^p) .
D2. a/ Pj^p =q) « 1
b/ Pj(pjq) - 1
c/ ^ ( p a r )  “ 1
d / Pjíp) > V1(q)I'1(r) > 0 
el V^r) < 1 
f/ P2(r) ■= 1
P2(q) > F^q)
Proof: according to a/, d/ and f/ T14. is Fjip) “ F^(p)
F^r) > F^q) .
By virtue of b / and T7., Fj(p) <, Fjiq). Hence Fjiq) > F^(q).
4. Bpistemic Utility of the Hypotheses
When accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, we must con­
sider its relative truth value and the oognitive situation in 
which our epistemic decision has been made. To begin with, 
let us consider the concept of cognitive situation.
We can distinguish two types of cognitive boundary situ­
ation: namely, the revolutionary situation which renews the 
given field of cognition, and the process »hioh only adds to 
the given scope of experience. A certain boldness in the 
formation of hypotheses is characteristic of the former, while 
moderate advancement characterises the latter. Between these 
two extreme situations, all the other "mixed research situ­
ations’ occupy an intermediate position.
Let X signify the factor qualifying the nature of the cogni­
tive situation. Let us postulate that regarding it, 0 < X < 1 
is fulfilled, where X - 0 denotes the moderate, and X « 1
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the bold, cognitive situation. For lack of a better method, 
the value of 1 must be determined using estimation.
As already stated, the relative truth value (V truth 
value) constitutes an indirect type of correspondence between 
the thought content of a statement and reality. It may happen, 
then, that a certain V truth value is attributed to a hypoth­
esis in a given cognitive situation, although it does not 
correspond to reality; that is to say, it is false in the 
classical sense. (C-false) It is feasible that we may be 
entirely right in our reasoning and cognition still suffers 
a loss, if we wrongly accept a hypothesis with a V truth value 
higher than the minimum, but C-false. Naturally enough, we 
also cause a loss if we reject a C-true hypothesis on the 
basis of a given V truth value. Nevertheless, it is evident 
that epistemic utility can only be expected if we accept C- 
true hypotheses or reject C-false hypotheses in the function 
of the cognitive situation.
Let us introduce the following notations to measure 
epiatemie utility:
£/+(p+ ) « the epistemic utility resulting from the 
acceptance of the C-true hypothesis p;
£/+(p ) = the epistemic utility resulting from the 
acceptance of the C-false hypothesis;
V (p+ ) “ the epistemic utility resulting from the
rejection of the C-true hypothesis;
V (P ) = the epistemic utility resulting from the
rejection of the C-false hypothesis.
Let us start from the following intuitive considerations
(1) The bolder the cognitive situation, and/or the higher the 
V truth value of the hypothesis is, the less advantageous 
its acceptance, and vice-versa, presuming that the 
hypothesis is C-true.
(2) The bolder the cognitive situation, and/or the higher the
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F truth value of the hypothesis is, the more destructive 
its acceptance, and vice-versa, presuming that the 
hypothesis is C-false.
(3) The bolder the cognitive situation, and/or the less the 
F truth value of the hypothesis is, the more destructive 
its rejection, and vice-versa, presuming that the 
hypothesis is C-true.
(4) The bolder the cognitive situation, and/or the higher 
the F truth value of the hypothesis is, the more advan­
tageous its rejection, and vice-versa, presuming that the 
hypothesis is C-false.
The following equations fulfil conditions (l)-(4):
(i) t’+(p+ ) + — = 1 - X F(p )(ii) V (p ) - —AF(p)
liil) t/"(p+ ) - -XF(~p)
iiv) I/"(p") = 1 - XF(~p)
bet us assume that X=1 and F(p) = 1, i.e. we have a F-true 
statement cf a maximum degree in a bold research situation.
Xr. this case, the following epistemic gains are possible:
i/'ip+ ) * 0; £/+(p ) = -1; U (p+ ) = O: Ü ( p ) = 1
We believe that the obtained values correspond to our intui­
tive expectations.
Let us assume that X«=0 and F(p) * 0, i.e. we have a 
statement of minimum F truth value in a precautious research 
situation. The following epistemic gains proceed:
t,+ (p+ ) • 1; t'+(p ) = O; I/~(p+ ) *= 0; i/~(p_ ) « 1
These values call for some explanation. It may be surprising, 
but is still conceivable, that the acceptance of a F-false 
but classically true statement in a cognitive situation de­
manding precaution is maximally advantageous. Just as advan­
tageous is to reject a F-false and a C-false statement. It 
does not directly follow from (l)-(4), but is required by
16
equalities (il) and (ill), that the hypotheses of the value 
of 7(p) *= 0, if they are C-false, and their rejection if they 
are C-true, should be epistemologically indifferent. Every 
formalization has less obvious consequences.
Due to lack of space, we will rot analyse the other two 
pairs of possibilities.
S. Epiatemio Utility of Synchronic and Diachronio 
Reasoning
Eplstemic utility can not only be attached to the ac­
ceptance or rejection of certain statements, but to inferenoee 
as well. Here, however, we must introduce the concept of ex­
pected epiatemic utility.
We start from the principle that an argumentation in a 
given cognitive stiuation is prospectively the more advan­
tageous, the higher the V truth value of its conclusion, and 
the greater the eplstemic utility of the conclusion when it 
is C-true and accepted; and also, the least its destructivity 
if it is C-false and yet accepted. This intuitive requirement 
is satisfied by the following formula:
(i) Es(p) - F(p)U+(p+ ) + F(~p)i/+(p")
The appropriate substitutions and calculations give:
(ii) Es(p) « F(p)(1 - X)
(Index a indicates that Eg(p> measures the expected eplstemic 
utility of the synchronic inferences.)
To be able to apply formula (li), however, we must 
determine the minimum value of the expected eplstemic utility 
which still enables us to speak of a plausible acceptance. 
This is called the norm of acceptance. must be at least as 
large as 1-X, which can be interpreted as the degree of
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reliability or cautiousness, namely:
(iii) £g(p) = 1 - 1
Nevertheless, it can be seen from a comparison of (ii) and 
(Hi) that Eg(p) can only be, at the very best, equivalent to 
1-X, that is, when X=1 or if V(p) = 1 and X<1. In every other 
case, the expected epistemic utility falls short of the norm 
of epistemic utility, i.e. types of reasoning like S2. do not 
provide acceptable epistemic utility.
The situation is entirely different in the case of 
diachronic argumentations. Here we must take the following 
premise as our starting point: the higher the V truth value 
of an argumentation measured in a later cognitive situation, 
and the more the epistemic utility gained by its acceptance, 
if it is C-true (and the less the loss resulting from its 
acceptance if it is C-false) then the higher its expected 
epistemic utility will be. This requirement is fulfilled by 
the following formula:
e d (p )  = V2(p)V+ (p+ ) + V2(~p)U+(p~)
Substitutions and calculations lead to
(iv) £d(p> = *'2(p) " **ri(P ) •
Let the norm of the expected epistemic utility also be 1-X 
in the case of dlachronical inferences, and let it be re­
quired that
(v) fd(p) > 1 - X .
Let us consider reasoning Dl. from the point of view of 
requirement (v):
Suppose that X = 1 . Then
£d(p) “ F2(p) “ XFi(P ) > 0 and 
1 - X = 0 .
Consequently E^(p) > 0 .
Let X = 0. In this case
18
£d(p) *= F2(p) > 0 and 
1 - X «= 1 .
Therefore, only the equality
V?> ■ 1
may subsist, and only when 7j(p) “ 1.
In other words, in a precautions cognitive situation, 
the only acceptable diachronic reasoning is that which offers 
a maximally V-true conclusion. This result does not contra­
dict our intuitive expectations.
It is hoped that we have succeeded in demonstrating that 
VL, even in this roughly outlined form, can be a useful device 
in the philosophy of science. It is suitable in elucidating 
many problems which are beyond the reach of the majority of 
logical systems. It is a significant merit of VL that it 
clarifies the relationship between the relative and the 
classical truth concept and in many respects generalizes 
probabilistic logic.
Technical University, Miskolc 
Institute of Philosophy, Budapest
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KATALIN G. HAVAS
IMPLICATIONS OF AN ONTOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 
(A Critique of M. Bunge’s Critical Examination of Dialectics)
A good old maxim advises as to take heed to every crit­
icism even if it only contains five per cent of the truth.
The trouble is that in roost cases truth and falsehood are 
not conveyed by separate propositions in the criticisms and 
therefore it is often impossible to select five, ten, twenty 
or even more per cent of the critical statements which are 
true and Justified as opposed to the rest which are false. 
Criticism must therefore be considered in its entirety, with­
in its systemic context. Moreover, sometimes unjustified 
critical statements may be the consequences of some deficiency 
in the theses criticised and are thus useful and instructive. 
That is why one must clarify the presuppositions that underlie 
one's system in order to make sure if the critic's presuppo­
sitions basically coincide with them or not. Otherwise the 
arguments and counterarguments do not refer to the same the­
ses, which constitutes the logical fallacy of ignoratio elenchi.
Applying these methodological principles to "A Critical 
Examination of Dialectics" by Mario Bunge,1 the first question 
to arise is as follows:
Does M. Bunge really criticise the theory of dialectics?
However, in the given case, even putting the question 
poses some problems. It implies admitting the existence of 
the scientific theory of dialectics, of which some philoso­
phers - such as M. Bunge - may have a clear conception, or 
they may have a faulty conception if they do not know it prop­
erly.
M. Bunge's point of departure is that the theses of dia­
lectics are not formulated with sufficient precision to con-
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temporary scientific standards. They are ambiguous and are 
surrounded by a mystical fog. I agree with this and, for the 
same reason, I propose that M. Bunge's picture of dialectics 
(and the presuppositions underlying it) cannot be contrasted 
with "the real", "the actual" theory of dialectics, only with 
eome conception or interpretation of it.
To be sure, one cannot say that M. Bunge attacks a 
nonexistent theory which he only contrives for the purpose 
of shadow fighting. Even though his reformulation of dialec­
tical theses exaggerates some allegedly Marxist views, most 
of his conclusions are supported by evidence we find in some 
studies in dialectics. This does not only hold true of sim­
plistic textbooks or of seemingly original works which lack 
scientific rigour. What is here concerned is the essential 
core of a real and effective theory, an ontological approach 
to dialectics. I am going to examine some features of M. Bun­
ge's critique of dialectics which follow from this (I believe 
fallatious) ontological point of view.
1. The Principles of Dialectical Ontology
1.1 On the theory of reflection
As is well known, Hegel wanted to base his explanation 
of the laws of being on the laws of thinking. He saw the 
"idea", the "concept" as existing forever independently of the 
human brain and as manifesting itself in nature as well as 
becoming itself in human thinking. Therefore, by exploring the 
idea or the form it has found in human thought we also get the 
structure of reality. Hegel believed he could construe the 
world on the basis of the analysis of the movement of thought. 
Marx remarked of Hegel that "With him, it [dialectic] is 
standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, 
if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical 
shell." Some philosophers Interpreted Marx's instruction like 
this: Hegel's point of departure is thought, for him it is the
21
movement of thought which is objectified in nature. Turning 
dialectic right side up again means that now nature should be 
the point of departure and every product of thinking is to be 
considered as a reflected image of nature. While for Hegel 
the laws are primarily mental and exist in nature as manifes­
tations of the spirit, once the relationship is reversed we 
suppose that laws exist in nature independently of thinking 
and that their copies in the mind are the laws of thinking. 
Objective dialectics is the dialectics of real things. The 
laws of dialectical logic - so they say - are the photographic 
Images of that objective dialectics.
The implications of this version of the theory, for 
example, for the approach to contradictions can be summarized 
briefly and approximately like this: In reality there are 
contradictions, therefore those logical contradictions are 
necessary which express real contradictions. Hence a pair of 
contradictory propositions are both true if they express some 
contradiction of reality.
One has indeed no other choice than question the valid­
ity of either dialectics or formal logic unless one recognizes 
the active, creative character of reflection. M. Bunge crit­
icises dialectics on the same grounds: "Indeed, if every 
statement reflects something real, then every contradictory 
statement must reflect some ontic contradiction, which is in 
turn the source of some change. But since a contradiction is 
false, it cannot reflect anything real. Hence either there is 
no change or the reflection theory of knowledge must part 
company with dialectics."3 All that would be so if the ref­
lection theory of knowledge Indeed claimed that in the case 
of every true statement there is something in reality of which 
the given statement is a copy. It would be so if that theory 
Ignored the fact that man's reflection of nature is no simple, 
direct, total reflection, or to quote Lenin, that "... in hu­
man concepts nature is reflected in a distinctive way (this 
NB: in a distinctive and d i a l e c t i c a l  wayll)"*
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1.2 The activity of ooneeioueneee as an ontio factor
M. Bunge's criticism of dialectics rests on the as­
sumption that dialectical ontology deals with concrete ob­
jects. Thus his criticism is only relevant for such theories 
of dialectics as maintain that ontology describes things as 
existing Independently of man and his practical activity.
Such theories Ignore the fact that every ontology (l.e. every 
system aiming to describe the world's general characteris­
tics) necessarily reproduces the objective transposed into 
concepts and propositions. This mental transposition implies 
that ontology ie inextricably bound up with the characteris­
tics of mental reconstruction. This makes ontology no less 
representative of objective reality than are physics, chemis­
try, etc, for the latter are not indirectly based on the 
things in themselves either (in most cases) but on things as 
conceived by consciousness (and embedded in a language).
It is essential for every materialist to recognize the 
external world as existing Independently of consciousness and 
as being primary over consciousness. However, it is not at all 
essential for materialism to regard the reflection of reality 
in consciousness as free from the specific consequences of 
mental transposition. Moreover, a materialist need not believe 
in the direct derivabllity of every product of consciousness 
from reality which is not qualified as the product of false 
consciousness. On the contrary: the ignorance of the active, 
creative nature of the reflection by consciousness and the on­
tology resulting from that ignorance generates the above men­
tioned "mystical fog" surrounding the laws of dialectics.
2. The thesis that for every thing there is an
antithing
M. Bunge formulates one of the theses of the dialectical 
ontology he criticises as follows:
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*Dla For every thing (concrete object) there Is an 
antithlng*5
First of all it must be clarified what the "thing" sub­
jected to ontological investigation is.
2.1 The "thing" ae the starting point of ontological 
investigations is not the thing in itself but its 
mental representation already transposed into concepts
A "thing" is a "plant", an "electron" or a "product" 
etc. But if I say "thing", "plant", "electron", "product", 
etc., I already speak of something in the form of a concept.
It has already been isolated from whatever else I do not con­
sider as that thing, that plant, that electron etc. What is 
more, I am now thinking of the particular thing as belonging 
to some system (as a living organism, a microphysical object, 
a social phenomenon etc.) and thus I am abstracting from its 
characteristics which are not related to its belonging to that 
system. Without isolation, we cannot speak about it even 
though we known that nothing isolated exists in nature which 
would only be a "living organism", an "electron" (only a thing 
individuated by the group of properties "A") and nothing 
else. The isolation and delineation of something from the rest 
of nature is an act of man. No individuation or separation 
(which results in the Isolation of "A" from "non A") can take 
place without thinking, i.e. some activity of mind. Now, is 
this order imposed upon nature by us? No, or at least not 
arbitrarily. Abstraction is based on objective grounds. Let us 
take, for example, a concrete thing which behaves as a commod­
ity when brought to the market while in other areas it appears 
as an article of consumption. That is why we can say: it is a 
"thing with exchange-value" or a "thing with use-value". In 
fact it is both at the same time and also many other "things": 
a blue thing, a warm thing, somebody's favourite piece of 
clothing, an antiquity etc.
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Generally speaking, if a concrete thing is conceived 
of in the form of a concept resulting from the selection of 
group A of its properties, it will always be true that as 
long as it preserves group A of its properties it is identi­
cal with itself as a thing possessing properties A and is 
different from all those not having properties A. Taken in 
this sense, the self-identity of things is a general law of 
reality valid for all real things. This self-identity of 
things is a precondition to the existence of scientific laws. 
When we think of some concrete thing as A, we have in this 
way raised the particular to the level of the general. For 
this very reason, whatever we know of a thing with property A 
conceived as A will always and everywhere be true of any other 
thing with property A also conceived as A.
2.2 la M. Bunge right to euppoee that, aooording to
Marxiét dialectical ontology, every "thing" exiete 
separately in the world and there existe one and 
only one "antithing" isolated from itt
Marx sets out to examine the categories of political 
economy by explaining that "production" is a result of «di­
straction: ’Production in general is an «distraction, but a 
rational «distraction in so far as it really brings out and 
fixes the common element..."6 "There are characteristics which 
all stages of production have in common, and which are est«d>- 
lished as general ones by the mind...’7 (Italics mine, K.G.H. ) 
Having stated that "production" is the result of the mind's 
act of generalization and «distraction Marx adds that every 
category established through «distraction also implies the sep­
aration of the «distract moments. He refers to Spinoza's thesis: 
"determinatio est negatio".
Through creating the concept of "production" we have 
separated this process from consumption, distribution, or ex­
change. However, as Marx says, thinking must not be reproached 
with that. The separation is a consequence of "the grasping of
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real relations*, even though it is a mistake to think that, 
for example, the spheres of distribution and of production 
are independent, autonomous neighbours.
"Production, then, is also immediately consumption, 
consumption is also immediately production", Marx says and 
he goes on: "Thereupon, nothing simpler for a Hegelian than 
to posit production and consumption as identical".
Later he summarizes his own position like this: "The 
conclusion we reach is not that production, distribution, ex­
change and consumption are identical, but that they all formgthe members of a totality, distinctions within a unity. Ac­
cording to Marx, the contradiction between production and con­
sumption is a real contradiction, as far as it is a reflec­
tion of a relation of reality. But what has previously been 
said about "production" clearly indicates that the contra­
diction here formulated is influenced by the fact that "pro­
duction" relations as well as "consumption" relations are al­
ready defined and therefore distinguished from every other 
relation.
Engels writes: "The recognition that these antagonisms 
and distinctions, though to be found in nature, are only of 
relative validity, and that on the other hand their imagined 
rigidity and absolute validity have been introduced into na­
ture only by our reflective minds - this recognition is the 
kernel of the dialectical conception of nature."10 It would 
be false to conclude from Engels's idea that it is a mistake 
in our thinking to make what exists in reality rigid and dis­
tinct. On the contrary, this is a necessary characteristic of 
the thinking activity. The mistake is not to recognize this as 
a necessary characteristic of thinking. The dialectical app­
roach requires us to take this fact into account and to accept 
the conclusions that follow from it.
In this respect, I attach great importance to one of 
Hegel's remarks and Lenin's comments on it. "What makes the 
difficulty is always thought alone, since it keeps apart the
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moments of an object which in their separation are really 
united." Lenin thought Hegel's idea was right and commented : 
"We cannot imagine, express, measure, depict movement, without 
interrupting continuity, without simplifying, coarsening, dis­
membering, strangling that which is living. The representation 
of movement by means of thought always makes coarse, kills, - 
and not only by means of thought, but also by sense-percep­
tion, and not only of movement, but every concept.
2.3 The oonerete thing in ite totality
The following is a quite frequent - and, in my judge­
ment, fallacious - argumentation:
If something has contradictory properties in different 
respects (i.e. in one respect it is A while in another it is 
not-A) then the concrete thing viewed as a whole can be said 
as such to be both A and not-A. Hence if a concrete thing is 
conceived in ite totality, then contradictory statements can 
be truly asserted of it.
The fault with this argument lies in the vagueness of 
"the thing conceived in its totality." Another question is 
whether it is possible to judge the thing as a whole in one 
statement, i.e. whether "the thing in its totality" can be the 
subject in a statement.
To answer these questions, we must first of all distin­
guish between the concrete in reality and the concrete in the 
mind. Thinking proceeds through the particular propositions,
i.e. from the knowledge of some aspect of the concrete in rea­
lity (the really concrete) towards the production of the con­
crete in the mind (the mentally concrete).
At the beginning of the cognitive process we only have 
abstract concepts of the object. Such concepts arise as the 
results of previous processes of observation or thinking. Ab­
stract concepts give us the possibility to understand different 
aspects of the really concrete. When in the process of our 
cognizance of a concrete thing we formulate our knowledge in
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statements we never use one statement to say something about 
the real concrete whole, only about some aspect of the con­
crete whole. The mentally concrete is a system of knowledge,
i.e o n  a given level of knowledge, it is the synthetization 
of particular propositions about the different respects of 
the really concrete.
Certain investigations seem to show that contradictory 
propositions follow from the system of knowledge reproducing 
a concrete thing. This type of logical contradiction has a 
positive role in cognition. It may arise from the fact that 
different sides, or aspects, of the concrete thing have not 
been sufficiently isolated from each other. If the contra­
diction stems from this circumstance (of course it may also 
be due to some other,logical fault), then the consideration 
that property A belongs to the concrete thing under a dif­
ferent aspect than property non-A will raise the mentally 
concrete image of the thing to a new level, where the former 
logical contradiction is resolved. As is well known, Aristot­
le saw no logical contradiction between statements which at­
tribute contradictory properties to one and the same sub­
stance under different aspects.
3. Dialectical negation
I agree with M. Bunge's claim that the concept of neg­
ation needs to be clarified if we are to get rid of the mis- 
tifying fog surrounding dialectics. The concept of negation 
is indeed ambiguous. Recent logical investigations have shown 
that outside the framework of classical, two-valued logic 
quite a wide range of negations can be distinguished. More­
over, even within classical two-valued logic, the concept of 
negation is subject to various philosophical Interpretations. 
But let us mind our business: it is no excuse for the vague­
ness of the concept of "dialectical negation" that the con­
cept of "formal logical negation" is not clear,either.
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The concept of dialectical negation is sometimes used 
in the ontological and sometimes in the logical sense.
3.1 Ontological dialectical "negation"
An example of ontological dialectical ‘negation* is 
where Engels considers the barley plut as the dialectical 
negation of the grain from which it has arisen. Another exam­
ple is private landed property which he says to be the dia­
lectical negation of the common ownership of land found at an 
earlier stage of the development of civilised peoples.
It is one of the most essential characteristics of ‘ne­
gation* so interpreted that it corresponds to a stage of de­
velopment, which opens up the possibility of further develop­
ment, that is, the negation of negation through further ne­
gation.
To return bo Engels's examples, the fully developed bar­
ley plant once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as 
they have ripened the stalk dies; private landed property be­
comes a fetter on production, so its negation becomes neces­
sary in its turn, that is, the transformation of land into 
common property. After several other examples, Engels points 
out that each of these processes is specific and basically 
different from the rest. “When I say that all these processes 
are a negation of the negation, I bring them all together un­
der this one law of motion, and for this very reason I leave 
out of account the specific pecularities of each individual 
process.*12
Unfortunately, Engels did not specify what characteris­
tics these processes had in common owing to which, despite all 
their differences, they would be taken to be the manifesta­
tions of one and the same law of motion, the law of the nega­
tion of negation. It is nevertheless sure that the meaning of 
the word “negation" in this case significantly differs from 
that associated with logical operations. (This is why I put it in 
quotes above where I used it to mean the ontological dialecti-
29
cal negation). It is questionable whether the word negation 
should have been borrowed from Hegel at all to signify the 
Hegelian idea "turned right side up again". However, what is 
important is not the words but the clarity of their concep­
tual contents. The characteristics of ontological dialectical 
"negation* and the "negation of negation’ can be described 
as follows. Such "negation" is the result of the transition 
from being so to being otherwise where "becoming otherwise" 
means the emergence of something ontologlcally new, which 
amounts to development. In the new thing emerging from nega­
tion, there is the possibility of another negation (the 
transition from being so to being otherwise), that is to say, 
the possibility of the negation of negation. The new thing 
coming about as a result of the negation of negation does not 
merely correspond to the restoration of the original condi­
tion, it rather constitutes a higher stage of its development. 
The new thing which has come about in this way can be said to 
have an inherent, "innate" dialectical contradiction. Here 
again, similarly to "ontological dialectical negation", the 
term "contradiction" is used in a special sense which does 
not correspond to what the term "logical contradiction* de­
signates. To be contradictory means, in this special sense, 
to possess characteristics of both the old thing and its on­
tological dialectical negate.
It must also be noted that ontological "negation" is a 
feature of the process of transition. Obviously, in Engels's 
example, the grain does not exist simultaneously with the 
plant which has arisen from it as its negate. The new grain 
(— x) does not come about through the union of the old grain 
(x) and the plant (-x). To suppose this would be an absurdity.
Consequently M. Bunge, in objecting to the Marxist inter­
pretation of ontological dialectical negation that "... one 
thing x and its dialectical negate -x cannot continue to form 
a third object..."13, commits the logical mistake of substi­
tuting another thesis for the one he seeks to refute.
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3.2 Dialectical negations in the development 
of knowledge
The results of a cognitive process are formulated in 
propositions or, rather, in systems of propositions. Proposi­
tions on a certain level of knowledge can only provide a rel­
atively faithful representation of what is in reality. The 
progress of knowledge leads to the formulation of new propo­
sitions which ensure a deeper understanding of reality. Ac­
cording to the theory of dialectics, the progress of know­
ledge in this way constitutes an infinite process of man's 
attaining more and more profound knowledge of things, phe­
nomena or processes, a constant progress from the phenomena 
to the essence, and from superficial to intrinsic essence. 
Throughout this process new knowledge, even though it is dif­
ferent from the old one and transcends it, in most cases does 
not exclude the old body of knowledge as unacceptable in erery 
respect. Such a relationship between old and new knowledge is 
called the relation of dialectical negation, Lenin so charac­
terizes this form of negation: "Not empty negation, not fu­
tile negation, not eoeptieal negation, vacillation and doubt 
is characteristic and essential in dialectics, - which un­
doubtedly contains the element of negation and indeed as its 
most important element - no, but negation as a moment of con­
nection, as a moment of development, retaining the positive,
14l.e., without any vacillations, without any eclecticism".
"Empty" negation turns a true proposition into a non- 
true one, and vice versa. In such a case, assertion and nega­
tion are Incompatible. By contrast, in the acts of dialecti­
cal negation performed by cognitive thought, "in relation to 
the... negative proposition, the »dialectical moment* demands 
the demonstration of »u n i t  y«?, l.e., of the connection of 
negative and positive, the presence of this positive in the 
negative. From assertion to negation - from negation to 
’»unity«? with the asserted - without this dialectics becomes 
empty negation, a game, or scepsis."15
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Dialectical negation ie not a logical operation performed 
upon an elementary propoeition. Let A be an elementary (un­
analyzed) proposition (which, within the frame of two-valued 
logic, can take one and only one of the values true or false.) 
Then the dialectical negation of A la only possible through 
analyzing A into its components and thus transforming it into 
a compound proposition. If A was previously considered true, 
then, after the transformation, only one of its parts or as­
pects is regarded as true, while another part, which is no 
longer considered true, is replaced by contents different from 
the earlier ones. Furthermore, throughout the development of 
knowledge, dialectical negations are not only connected to 
changes in the components of compund propoeitione, but to the 
development of the concepts used in the propositions.
To take an example, let the proposition A be an asser­
tion of the Initial practical application of penicillin:
Antibiotics are effective against diseases caused by
microorganisms.
Contrary to this assertion, it later turned out that 
penicillin (the only antibiotic known at the time) destroys 
only certain strains of microorganisms, while other germs 
remain (or become) resistant to it. Researchers tried to sur­
mount this difficulty by producing more and more kinds of 
antibiotics different from penicillin in some respects. Thus 
the concept of "antibiotics" has undergone development and 
generalization, covering several new species concepts. Con­
sequently, the proposition A containing the concept of anti­
biotics has also changed.
However, even other antibiotics discovered subsequently 
proved to have only short-lived success. Soon new types of 
microorganisms appeared which could resist them. Moreover, it 
was found that the increasing number of resistant microorgan­
isms changed the symptoms of some diseases, thus rendering 
diagnosis more difficult and aggravating the patients' con­
dition. These facts seemed to question the truth of both the
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original proposition A and its improved versions. But in the 
course of the development of science, it was not enough to 
resort to an "empty" negation of proposition A, like:
It is not true that antibiotics are effective againstdiseases caused by microorganisms.
If such a negation was ever made, it was just the start­
ing point on the way to understanding the causes. Then it was 
necessary to subdivide the contents of statement A into sever­
al statements, and to separate the portion of its contents 
which was true from that which was not true.
Since further research showed that the propagation of 
resistant microorganisms was, to a lesser extent, due to the 
antibiotics themselves and, to a greater extent, to their mis­
application, a new suggestion could be put forward:
Antibiotics can only be used with great care and caution,
in the appropriate quantity. So used, antibiotics are
very efficient against certain kinds of disease.
In this phrasing, in some sense, we have some back to 
proposition A# which, however, has retained some elements of 
its negate.
The dialectical negation of negation in thought is, in 
general, the law of development of systems of propositions,
i.e. theories.
The development of a theory may occur merely through the 
development of knowledge or through the extension of the the­
ory over new areas. But it may also occur in relation to 
changes or development in reality. As the above example shows, 
knowledge (here the discovery of penicillin) can have an ef­
fect on reality where it may Induce changes (the appearance 
of new microorganisms), and these changes may in turn urge the 
further development of theory. This is another reason why it 
is important to stress that the dialectical negation of nega­
tion is but an apparent recurrence to the original point.
Does the truth of the original proposition A follow from 
the truth of the system of propositions (theory) resulting
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from the dialectical negation of the negation of A?
In the sense "true" Is understood in two-valued logic, I 
do not think so. We may say that the original statement A *n_ 
voIved the kernel of the truth, but it is by no means on the 
same level of truth than the result of the negation of nega­
tion. Now we come to understand that the truth concept used 
for dialectical negation in cognitive thought is different 
from the concept of "truth“ used in classical two-valued log­
ic. It is not only dialectical negation which must be inter­
preted as a moment of development, but truth must also be 
seen as developing, according to the dialectical view.
4. The relation of dialeotio to formal logic
In Bunge's view, logical theory describes the behaviour 
of concepts and propositions, while the laws of dialectics are 
ontological hypotheses. Therefore, logical objects and dia­
lectical objects are Incomparable.
It has been mentioned that the Interpretation of the ob­
jects of dialectics which M. Bunge presupposes is not the only 
one possible. Perhaps the most crucial issue in the prolonged 
controversy over the relationship between dialectics and for­
mal logic is the general disagreement as to the nature of 
their objects.
In what follows, I will try to show that the incompara­
bility of logics and dialectics is a claim which presupposes 
the ontological view here criticised. I will also try to show 
that there are several conceptions of the nature of the ob­
jects of these two disciplines which may serve as bases for 
the comparability and compatibility of dialectics and logics.
4.1 Logie as ontology
The ontological conception of logic was already associ­
ated with traditional formal logic, and it also characterized
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Hegel's dialectical logic. Ever since its origin, mathematical 
logic has also been accompanied by the philosophical consid­
eration that the aim of logic is to build ontological struc­
tures . This view was given a degree of rationality by the 
fact that the construction of syntactical calculuses in math­
ematical logic Indeed caused changes in the subject matter of 
logic. Namely, the syntactic systems themselves are no longer 
about the laws and specificity of reasoning. The theses they 
contain usually have various possible interpretations each. 
Among others, in many cases, it is possible to give them an 
ontological interpretation.
In ontologically interpreted logical systems (OILS's), 
a tautology is a statement referring to all individuals. For 
example, the ontological interpretation of the proposition 
\fo(Fx v ~Fx) in classical two-valued first-order predicate 
logic (PL) is that any individual x either has property F or 
has not property F. Thus the ontologically interpreted tau­
tologies or laws in PL only differ in their degree of gen­
erality from the laws of such sciences as chemistry, physics, 
biology etc. They differ from them in the fact that, while 
the latter delineate a set of existents and only make state­
ments about them, the laws of PL are general assertions, about 
every existent, and not only about actual existents, but also 
possible ones.
An OILS is an ontology of actual and possible worlds. In 
classical mathematical logical systems, the logical structures 
of the real world (the world of actual existents) and possible 
worlds have the same principles. In these systems - in accord­
ance with the Leibnizian principle -, what is necessarily true 
in a given world wQ is true in every possible world. By now, 
following the development of semantics of modal logics, this 
principle has taken a modified form: the idea of all possible 
worlds has been replaced by the set of worlds which are the 
alternatives of world wQ , i.e. which bear a certain "alterna­
tiveness relation" or "accessibility relation" to wQ . Thus, 
within certain non-classical logical systems, there are pos-
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sible worlds permitted whose laws are not alternative to the 
laws of the worlds in classical logic. Owing to this, the 
following questions justly arise:
Is the real world Indeed the way it is described by the 
laws of classical logic? Are really all the worlds which are 
described as "deviating from the normal’ (i.e. deviating from 
the world described by classical logic) such as do not corre­
spond to the structure of the real world? If they are so, can 
they be considered as worlds at all? Can the structure of an 
’impossible possible world’ be called an ontological struc­
ture?
In order to find proper answers to these questions it is 
necessary to take account of the fact that no ontology, hence 
no OILS, corresponds to the structure of the existing world 
in it eelf. Every OILS bears certain specific traces of mental 
reconstruction. One such specific feature is that these sys­
tems inevitably rest on certain abstractions and presupposi­
tions about the world. (PL, for example, presupposes that the 
things of the world have sharply distinguishable properties 
etc.) Every OILS draws a picture of the world according to the 
abstractions and presuppositions which were accepted, con­
sciously or unconsciously, during the construction of the sys­
tem. If the presuppositions and/or the abstractions about the 
world are changed (like, for instance, the specificity of the 
alternative relation), then the class of worlds gets a dif­
ferent structure. In this way, according to the different 
structures, we obtain different "actual worlds’, each of which 
can be regarded at a certain level of abstraction as giving a 
picture of the world with certain presuppositions, but none 
can be regarded as free from presuppositions.
In his day, Hegel may have aspired to construct a system 
in which the deduction of one concept from another would 
yield the structure of the World, but by now we know that this 
is impossible. In the differently construed logical systems, 
if they are ontologically interpretable at all, nothing more 
is possible than the mental representation of certain sides.
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or features, of reality, at a certain level of abstraction, 
and with certain presuppositions about the structure of the
rclass of worlds and hence of the real world. The "different 
actual worlds* construed in different OILS's together form the 
mentally concrete picture of the World.
4.2 The relationehip of OILS’e with 
dialectics as an ontology
If it is supposed that both the ontologically interpreted 
classical formal logical system (OICLS) and dialectics attempt 
to give the ontology of the world in itself, then one of them 
must be rejected because it cannot fulfil its task. But if we 
regard the OICLS as being about the structure of the world 
pictured according to certain abstractions and presuppositions 
serving cognitive goals, then this alone is enough to find it 
compatible with dialectics, even the ontological conception 
of dialectics which Bunge presupposes.
If we extend our interest beyond classical formal logi­
cal systems (and nowadays it seems clear that formal logic 
covers much broader areas), then it will become even more ob­
vious that OILS's are not contradictory to dialectics. (For 
example, it is possible for certain paraconslstent logical 
systems to receive even the kind of ontological interpretation 
which corresponds to the view of dialectics Bunge criticises j16 
If dialectical ontology is regarded as having presuppositions 
different from those of the OICLS, then, outside classical 
formal logic, it is possible to contract OILS's which corres­
pond to certain presuppositions of dialectical ontology. How­
ever, to use a term borrowed from modal semantics, such a sys­
tem constitutes the image of a world which is inaccessible to 
the world of classical logic.
4.3 Logie as a theory of oognition
Personally, I agree with M. Bunge's opinion that logic 
deals with concepts and propositions, but I do not find it
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precise enough to say, as he does, that logic describee their 
behaviour. Namely, such a statement does not exclude a fal­
lacious, psychologlstic conception of logic. Logic in fact 
does not describe thinking, as geometry (or, to be more pre­
cise, any of the various systems of geometry) does not give 
descriptions of parallel objects (like, for example, railway 
tracks). What geometry deals with: parallel lines, circles, 
points without extension, one-dimensional lines etc. are 
abstractions, but, as such, they are suitable for grasping 
certain characteristics of objects. In a similar way, various 
logical systems, and hence logic as a whole, are suitable 
means of revealing certain characteristics of concepts and 
statements used in thinking. A particular logical system con­
stitutes only one approach to concepts and statements having 
concrete contents in thinking; it only reconstructs certain 
formal characteristics of thoughts. No chapter of logic cov­
ers "the concept" or "the statement" in their entirety, as 
they exist in human thinking. Logic, on the other hand, extra­
polates. It deals with the forms of possible operations which 
can be used to attain knowledge.
My view of logical objects is also different from M. 
Bunge's In maintaining, contrary to him, that the nature of 
logical objects is not independent from the nature of real 
entities and certain linguistic phenomena. Logic must, there­
fore, indirectly deal with objects belonging to these areas 
as well. Based on presuppositions about certain general fea­
tures of reality, logic investigates the possible forms, and 
the laws of the forms, of reasoning appearing in lingustic 
form and making knowledge of reality possible.
There is a view which, instead of construing dialectics 
as an ontology, holds it to be the theory of cognition. One 
version of this approach considers dialectical logic as a part 
of dialectics, the part which deals with the process of the 
development of knowledge in thinking, that is, with the char­
acteristics of the development of concepts, propositions and 
their systems. It analyses, for example, problems like the
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ones mentioned above: the negation of negation in the cog­
nitive process, or the path leading from abstract concepts to 
construing the mentally concrete.
Interpreted in such a way, dialectical logic is not a 
rival theory to classical formal logical systems, but another 
part, in its own right, within the whole of logic. There are 
logicians who find it possible to construct calculuses based 
on the study of certain characteristics belonging to this 
part of logic.
Within the variety of positions regarding dialectics as 
a theory of cognition, there is an approach to dialectical 
logic as the philosophy of logic. According to this view, 
dialectical logic is about the set of all logical theories.
It is based on the general principle that any theory in the 
set of logical theories, or any logical system, only consti­
tues a partial approach to logical objects. There is no ab­
solute logical system with true laws Independently of any 
abstraction whatever. Based on this principle, this approach 
deals with the philosophical comparison of different logical 
systems. In this sense, the task of dialectical logic is what 
Hegel said to be the most important task of reasont to show 
the infinite in the finite, to point out that what is dis­
integrated, isolated, abstracted in the different systems is 
in fact connected and can thus be brought into unity.
I fully agree with M. Bunge on the point that formal 
logic eannot be replaced by dialectics. But it is again his 
fault that he pretends as if the opposite conviction were an 
organic part of the theory of dialectics. In fact such a view 
is an implication of a rash identification of the laws of 
being and of consciousness, and I have tried to show that this 
fallacy need not characterize a Marxist, materialistic ap­
proach to dialectics.
Institute of Philosophy 
Budapest
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JÁNOS k elemen
LANGUAGE, ACTION AND SOCIETY
1. It is hard to imagine a more exemplary common place 
than the statement that language is a social institution. How- 
ever, the discussion about the social nature of language has 
not lost its attraction. Among the causes of the current im­
portance of this discussion we may note the following:
a/ It is always sensible to ask the question whether
language should not rather be considered as a biolog­
ical or individual-psychological fact.
b/ The arguments in favour of the possibility of a pri­
vate language have not been out-dated even after 
Wittgenstein.
cl It is by no means simple to expound what is meant by 
saying that language is a social phenomenon.
In this paper I should like to deal with the notion of 
the social character of language. Let me observe by way of 
introduction that by accepting the statement about the social 
nature of language to be true one is committed to reject the 
possibility of a private language and the strong versions of 
innatism. This is of course not an empirical thesis: so I 
could have expressed this point perhaps by saying that I eus 
using the notion of the social character of language in a 
sense which excludes the possibility of a private language and 
innatism Cat least its strong versions).
This interpretation of the social character of language 
follows a great tradition the investigation of which might 
reveal unexpected connections. I have in mind the tradition in 
the framework of which Herder, Hegel, Humboldt, Marx or Witt­
genstein, in view of certain basic problems, can be regarded
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as representatives of very similar ideas. This tradition has 
evolved through breaking with classical rationalism and em­
piricism and rests on the supposition, formulated in different 
ways, that the concepts capturing collective phenomena are 
primary in relation to the concepts expressing individual 
ones. Such collective concepts are the concept of Spirit 
(Geist), of popular Spirit or Spirit of Nation (Volksgeist), 
of life (das Leben), of social consciousness (Gesellschafts­
bewusstsein), of forms of life (Lebensformen), and so on. It 
is part of this supposition that the Isolated individual 
(such as the animated statue of Condillac or Diderot) is un­
thinkable not only on a factual but a conceptual level too. 
Human consciousness and awareness cannot have emerged on the 
basis of the sensuous experiences belonging merely to an in­
dividual biography. The individual person can become what he 
is only by appropriating the conditions of his community and 
by participating in the different forms of the common Spirit. 
Therefore, language cannot be a device of connecting subse­
quently the separate individuals or of expressing and commu­
nicating ulteriorly the thoughts which were born in the pri­
vate and independent sphere of the mind. Language is a social 
phenomenon essentially and not only with respect to the con­
tingent circumstances of its functioning.
In this tradition the philosophy of language obtains 
great importance. The essentially social character of language 
becomes the main reason for taking every kind of individuality 
to be of a social disposition and for taking the very individ­
ual mind to be a social entity. It is worth while comparing a 
few characteristic quotations. F. v. Schlegel says that "even 
when we are alone, or we believe us to be alone, in our think­
ing we have to be, actually, in two and our most intimate and 
deepest being has to be recognized as essentially dramatic." 
("...das wir selbst dann, wenn wir allein sind, oder allein 
zu seyn galuben, immer eigentlich noch zu Zweyen [denken 
und dies auch so in unserem Denken finden, und unser inners-
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tes tiefstes Seyn als ein wesentliches drammatiscbe anerken­
nen müssen.’)1 W. v. Humboldt expounds this idea in a similar 
way: ’Without taking into consideration the communication 
among men language is a necessary condition of the thinking of 
an individual in closed isolation.’ (’Ohne daher irgend auf 
die Mittheilung zwischen Menschen und Menschen zu sehn, ist 
das Sprechen eine nothwendige Bedingung des Denkens des Ein­
zelnen in abgeschlossener Einsamkeit.’*) And I believe the 
similarity of Marx's formulation is quite striking: ’Even if 
I pursue a scientific activity, an activity I seldom pursue 
jointly with others, I am acting in a social way because I am 
acting as a human being. Not only the medium of my activity - 
such as language itself in which the thinker works - is given 
me as a social product, my own existence is a social activi­
ty...". ("Allein auch wenn ich wissenschaftlich etc. tätig 
bin, eine Tätigkeit, die ich selten in unmittelbarer Gemein­
schaft mit andern ausfQhren kann, so bin ich gesellschaftlich, 
weil als Mensch tätig, Nichtnur das Material meiner Tätigkeit 
ist mir - wie selbst die Sprache, in der der Denker tätig 
ist - als gesellschaftliches Produkt gegeben, mein eignes Das­
ein ist gesellschaftliche Tätigkeit...’’) Another characteris­
tic Statement by Humboldt is that ’in man language is essen­
tially related to social being*. (’Im Menschen aber ist das 
Denken wesentlich an gesellschaftliches Dasein gebunden.’*) 
Note, by the way, that Humboldt already used the category of 
’gesellschaftliches Sein".
2. Even if it may seem to be astonishing I think it is 
true that analytical philosophy has repeated the development 
which led from classical empiricism through Kant to Hegel and 
the romantic movement. In a fairly interesting book Richard J. 
Bernstein has the following to say: "The stages in contempo­
rary epistemological investigations which have moved from 
phenomenalism with its foundation in sense data to the empha­
sis on a ,thing language' as an epistemological foundation, to 
the realization of the importance of 'theoretical constructs' 
and finally the 'new' concern with total 'conceptual frame-
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works' or 'language games' closely parallels the development 
that Hegel sketches for us in the opening sections of the 
Phenomenology."5 Bernstein's statement can be supported by 
the fact that, in opposition to the early stage of analytical 
philosophy, in the last two decades the problem of action has 
risen into prominence. The concept of action has come to play 
an important part for analytical philosophers just as the con­
cept of praxis has come to be one of the basic notions for 
Marxist thinkers. I am not proposing to deal with this strik­
ing parallel or its possible consequences, I am going to touch 
upon its linguistic aspects.
It is evident that there is an intimate connection be* 
tween the popularity of speech act theory and the general in­
terest in the problem of action. Austin accomplished a real 
revolution, as he could subsume language under a new category, 
the category of action, the introduction of which into lin­
guistic investigations seemed to have no precedent and was 
contrary to the usual way of accounting for language in terms 
of sign systems. This revolution, however, amounts to restore 
(willy-nilly) the tradition I characterized with the names of 
Herder, Schlegel, Humboldt or Marx. The foundation of Hum­
boldt's philosophy of language is to be found in the idea 
that language is primarily action and it is only its seconda­
ry feature that it can be taken for a system of signs, a 
structure, a means of expression, and so on. It is indeed 
conspicuous that the notions in terms of which Humboldt char­
acterizes language a3 a phenomenon of social life are activity 
(Handlung) and labour (Arbeit). He says, e.g.; ’Language is 
no work (Ergon), but an activity [. . r . It is a for ever re­
curring labour of the Spirit (Energeia).* (’Sie selbst ist 
kein Werk (Ergon), sondern eine Thätigkeit (Energeia) r.. .j . 
Sie ist nemlich die sich ewig widerholende Arbeit des Geis­
tes . ’ ‘
It is small wonder that the appreciation of language as 
an essentially social phenomenon and its consideration as a
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form of activity were so intimately interwoven in the tradi­
tion discussed above. I believe this contingent historical 
fact throws light upon a conceptual connection too. It ia a 
part of the theaie of the social character of language that 
language to a form of activity and its all other functions, 
including the descriptive one, are submitted to this feature. 
This conceptual connection is described in Marxism in the 
form of reducing language to labour. As is well known, the 
explanation of language in terms of labour is, according to 
Engels, the only correct account.7 Engels's relevant state­
ments seem to refer only to a genetic tie between language 
and labour but it is fully intelligible to suppose that la­
bour has a prominent role not only in the genesis of language 
but also in framing its immanent structure. So far, Marxism 
has not taken much advantage of its theoretical possibilities 
in this field but what is to be regarded as a starting-point for a 
Marxist theory in examining the nature of language was ex- 
plicity formulated by G. Lukács: "in the dynamic structure of 
ordinary language the most general features of human praxis 
are expressed." ("In dieser dynamischen Struktur der Sprache 
des Alltags drQckt sich die allgemeine Wesensart [...1 der 
menschlichen Praxis aus [ ..,] •. * )
3. The most dangerous rival conception to explaining 
language in terms of praxis, to subsuming it under the cate­
gory of action and, in general, to the idea of the social de­
termination of language is to be found in the theory in which 
the linguistic power of man is accounted for in biological 
terms. If the view of holding language to be part of the in­
herited biological programme is accepted then the reflections 
related to labour and to the forms of social actions will be­
come irrelevant.
It is well-known that Chomsky worked out his innatism in 
controversy with the behaviourist conceptions (which are a 
matter of secondary importance for our discussion here). 
Moreover, the arguments in favour of his own conception owe 
their strength to having been born in this context.
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Let us recall that the argument which has been consid­
ered the most powerful rests upon the assumption that in the 
process of language learning the child is confronted with a 
finite number of data from adult language. On the basis of a 
finite number of data he succeeds, however, in constructing a 
grammar which enables him to generate an infinite number of 
sentences. This fact counts as evidence both for the crea­
tivity and the innateness of the human language faculty. It 
is worth noting that this argument seems to be strong also be­
cause the scientific paradigm prevailing in the given situa­
tion, the behaviourist learning theory, was not able to ac­
count for the relation between the available data and the 
grammar possessed by the child.
Is this argument as strong as it appears to be? In the 
first place, its premise is false. It is not the case that the 
child is confronted with data from adult language. We get a 
better picture if we take into consideration that, while talk­
ing to children, adults are using a reduced language adapted 
to the level of the children. In other words, the conversation 
of adults between them can be truly described in accordance 
with the picture given by Chomsky, but in the light of a com­
mon experience and of current research we have to suppose the 
existence of a particular strategy applied by adults in the 
verbal interaction with children. This strategy rests upon a 
principle of gradual growth. It is only to a small degree that 
in its formal and semantic aspects the speech of adults can be 
more complicated than the actual language of children 13. In 
the verbal interaction with adults the child is not "exposed" 
to a chaotic conglomerate of data.
How is it possible to overlook such a simple fact? The 
answer, in my opinion, is to be found in Chomsky's philosophy 
of science, namely, in the way in which he extends the explan­
atory models of physics to linguistics. Conforming to Chomsky's 
picture the child is (subconsciously) a little scientist. He 
observes the speech of adults as the scientist observes the 
behaviour of physical bodies, and on the basis of the available
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data he constructs and controls hypotheses as the scientist 
does in the light of his own data. (Needless to say: the child 
performs these acts of scientific observation without being 
aware of what he is doing.) According to this picture the 
child has the role of an observer. Contrary to this, during 
the period of language learning the child does not observe 
anything. He communicates and takes part in interactions.
At this stage Chomsky could work out a defence in the 
following way. It makes no difference what kind of language is 
used by the adults. What counts alone is the fact that the 
child constructs a grammar relying upon a finite number of ob­
servational data. Quite apart from the nature of the data, he 
is gaining experiendte and his experience is sufficient for 
actualizing the underlying innate principles. This, in es­
sence, amounts to a Kantian solution in itself and though, in 
general, it is not to be rejected it does not work here. The 
counter-argument is still founded upon the assumption that the 
child does observe the linguistic facts of his environment. 
However, observing the linguistic facts and taking part in 
communicative interactions are two fully different things. We 
have to make a sharp conceptual distinction between them.
There is evidence that the child who is exposed to a number of 
linguistic stimuli but lacks the possibility of taking part in 
mutual communication does not learn to speak in a normal way.* 
(Such a situation arises in the case of a child who may watch 
the television but is not talked to. ) Relying on these find­
ings there is much to be said for the thesis according to which 
language learning does not follow the pattern underlying learn­
ing strategies in the field of other kinds of knowledge. Lan­
guage learning cannot be described in terms of theoretical gen­
eralizations on the basis of observational data; it is to be 
described in terms of Interaction and controlled communication. 
Communication is action and, as has been pointed out by Haber­
mas18 as well, it is not experience.
4. If language capacity is innate then, evidently, what 
is to be taken into consideration in explaining its nature is
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only its structure. There cannot be any essential connection 
between its structure and its use. So there cannot be any in­
teresting connection between structure and speech acts, be­
tween structure and communication. Chomsky himself emphasizes 
that “language is essentially a system for expression of tho­
ughts",11 and, therefore, language cannot be accounted for in 
terms of communication. "Communication is only one function 
of language, and by no means an essential one."11 (The quota­
tions are taken from Chomsky's book of 1975 but, as far as I 
can see, his standpoint, in this respect, has not changed sub­
stantially1’. As a matter of fact, it is the standpoint which 
is compatible with innatism.)
Searle, on the other hand, has convincing arguments for 
assuming that meaning and speech acts, linguistic structure 
and communication are interdependent.111 The debate of Chomsky 
and Searle is going on in terms of structure and function, 
but it is only one form, the modern form, of the debate on 
the more general question whether language is essentially or 
only contingently a social phenomenon.
The notion of action refers to the specific human be­
haviour all forms of which presuppose an explicit or implicit 
social context. It is, by the way, one of the main reasons 
for the descriptions of action to be dualistic, and that is 
why it is impossible to eliminate from them the intentional 
terms which cannot be translated into physical ones. What has 
been said holds true of linguistic actions too. If we take 
into consideration these characteristics of the notion of ac­
tion the following conclusion is to be drawn from the assumed 
innateness of linguistic structures: The structure, already 
given on the biological level, anticipates those contingent 
social contexts in which our actions are performed and are to 
be taken for actions at all. Since every kind of social con­
texts emerged through history, such a conclusion, in my opin­
ion, is both unacceptable and senseless.
The danger of having to draw such a conclusion is evoked 
in Katz's proposal to combine spech act theory with genera—
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tive grammar.19 Katz's endeavour leads to a grammatical monism 
which makes all linguistic facts appear as a grammatical fact. 
This can be seen from the thesis that all information about 
the illocutionary force of a sentence is incorporated in the 
grammatical structure of that sentence. The thesis is ambigu­
ous. On the one hand, it would follow that language has a so­
cial nature also in the sense that all information about the 
essential types of social situations and actions are somehow 
coded in its historically developed structure. On the other 
hand, the above mentioned unacceptable conclusion can follow 
from it as well. According to this, provided the linguistic 
structure is inherited, language anticipates the historical 
types of social situations and actions. If one succeeded, as 
in my opinion Katz did not, in constructing a theory in the 
framework of which the speech acts and the illocutionary mean­
ings can be completely represented on a grammatical level I 
would commit myself to the former conclusion.
5. Finally, I would like to touch upon one more question 
in connection with the social character of language. Some time 
ago Marxists were discussing whether language belonged to the 
basis or the superstructure of the society. As is known, 
since the memorable debate Marxists have accepted the view 
that language belongs to neither. In the light of this it 
seems to be striking that in an important place of The German 
Ideology Marx speaks about a "bourgeois language". With re­
spect to certain words ("propriété", "Eigentum" and "Eigen­
schaft"; "Property", "Eigentum" and Eigentümlichkeit" and so 
on) Marx analyzes the interesting semantic feature of their 
being used both in a mercantile and an individual-psychologi­
cal sense.19 He noticed that the language governed by such 
semantic rules is a product of bourgeoisie. According to Lu­
kács 's interpretation this remark refers to the effects of 
reification upon language. The structures of reification pen­
etrate into the linguistic structure as such. Lukács added:
"A philological study from the standpoint of historical mate­
rialism could profitably begin here".17 I believe, following
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the remarks quoted, it could be systematically demonstrated 
that the concrete social structures and ideologies also have 
an effect upon the formal structure of language. The writers1' 
who suppose there being such a phenomenon as linguistic alien­
ation may be right. Such phenomena call attention to a new di­
mension of the social character of language.
Those, however, who limit the social character of lan­
guage to this dimension or are trying to build upon it a glob­
al linguistic theory, relevant from the point of view of so­
cial theory too, are on the wrong tack. One has to make a care­
ful distinction between what is to be taken for universal cat­
egories of a general social and linguistic theory and in what 
terms the connections of historically given social and lin­
guistic structures are to be described. In a given state of 
language these two kinds of determinations are interwoven, 
they form the different strata of a unique code. A linguistic 
theory which aims at elucidating the social nature of language 
has to establish a connection between the fundamental strata 
of the code and the basic structures of social life as such.
It will afterwards be possible to show the way in which the 
social-historlcally more specific strata or subcodes are re­
lated to this basis and in which they are organized into a 
functional whole in a given state of language. Although in the 
functioning of language these different factors cannot be sep­
arated and the consciousness of a given speaker is determined 
by the network of specific subcodes, language presupposes 
nothing else but the social as such. That could be put in this 
way toos The real language games are related to this or that 
form of life, but there is a transcendental language game 
which is the expression of the social as such.
Loránd Eötvös University 
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laszlő  pőlos
IS FREGEAN TRADITION DEAD?
(Or doet it oontain a viable alternativa to 
Situation Semantical)
Barvise and Perry Introduced a new semantic theory in 
1981,* attacking the semantic tradition initiated in Gottlob 
Frege's work. Frege's main claim is that the distinction be­
tween two kinds of semantic values for linguistic expressions 
is indispensable for the resolution of semantic problems. In 
his original terminology, these two values are 'Sinn' and 
'Bedeutung', and he distinguishes between the customary and 
the indirect uses of expressions:
If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends 
to speak of is their reference [Bedeutung] ... In re­
ported speech, words are used indirectly or have their 
indirect reference ... The indirect reference of a word 
is accordingly its customary sense [Sinn] 2
Frege extends the use of the Sinn - Bedeutung distinction 
from words to sentences as well. When a sentence is used em­
bedded - e.g. in the case of attitude reports - it refers, 
not to its Bedeutung but to its Sinn. This is only half of 
the story, however; one must also specify what Sinn and 
Bedeutung are. Frege's main objective is to model Bedeutung. 
Let the Bedeutung of individual terms be the ob­
ject the term refers to. (This is the only point where the 
use of 'refers to' is not misleading.) The Bedeutung of pred­
icates can be straightforwardly defined in terms of their 
extension. (This is already more problematic.) Finally, Frege 
defines the Bedeutung of a sentence as a truthvalue. (This is 
the strangest choice. It appears a sentence may have a truth- 
value; however a sentence does not refer to its truthvalue.) 
Problems, if there are any, are of a terminological nature.
To avoid misunderstanding, the following modification seems
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expedient: 'Bedeutung', which is a natural expression only in 
connection with individual terns, will be uniformly replaced 
by 'factual valu*'.
Barwise and Perry essentially retain the Fregean idea 
that sentences or words have two semantic values (although 
they hardly use the term 'semantic value'). They call the se­
mantic value corresponding to Frege’s Bedeutung 'interpreta­
tion', and the one corresponding to Sinn 'meaning'. The point 
they attack concerns the definition of interpretation. They 
argue that the Fregean treatment of truthvalues as interpre­
tations^actual values of sentences is fundamentally wrong.
Their argument can be summarized as follows. Frege's notion of 
Sinn is not a technically well established notion. Those logi­
cal-semantic theories (e.g., possible worlds semantics in gen­
eral and Montague's lntensional logic in particular), which 
attempt to explicate this notion in model theoretic terms, are 
faced with 9erious problems. These problems essentially stem 
from the fact that meaning (i.e. intension) is modelled as a 
function that assigns a factual value to expressions in every 
world sind at every time point. Given that the factual value of 
a sentence is either TRUE or FALSE, such a theory is incapable 
of distinguishing between the meanings of logically equivalent 
expressions, and must therefore declare logically equivalent 
expressions to be freely Interchangeable. On the basis of this, 
it does not take a great effort to generate an infinite number 
of semantic paradoxes.
The question posed in the title of this paper can now be 
articulated more clearly: Is it possible to have a logical se­
mantic theory that is compatible with Frege's choice as to the 
factual value of sentences but, at the same time, is capable 
of distinguishing between the intensions of logically equiva­
lent expressions? Accepting the metaphysical premise according 
to which whatever is, is possible, the answer must be yes. Im­
re Ruzsa's lntensional logic is such a theory.3
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Frege's own work cited above already contains the idea 
which, developed into an explicit theory, may offer a possi­
bility to distinguish between the meanings of logically e- 
quivalent expressions:
At any rate, one might expect that such sentences occur, 
just as there are parts of sentences having sense but 
not reference. And sentences which contain proper names 
without reference will be of this kind.4
Rúzsa's theory constitutes a consistent realization of 
this Fregean idea within the framework of intensional logic. 
The kernel of Frege's idea is retained: every linguistic ex­
pression has two semantic values, a factual value and an in­
tension. Linguistic expressions are classified into types, 
with the types of individual names and declarative sentences 
as primitives. All other expressions belong to some exten- 
slonal, or intensional, functor type. Every type has its do­
main, and the factual values of expressions belonging to a 
given type are taken from the domain of that type. The lack 
of a Bedeutung is represented in the theory in the following 
way: the domain of every extensional type contains a null-*n- 
tity. The property of having the null-entity (of the appro­
priate type) as a factual value - i.e. the value-gap - is in­
herited in extensional contexts, from subexpressions to con­
taining expressions.
Bearing in mind that every type has a null-entity in its 
domain, the definitions of 'intension' and 'intensional con­
text' are retained (with the difference that Rúzsa does not 
allow the iteration of intensions, but this is not pertinent 
to the present discussion).
The introduction of null-entities enables one to distin­
guish between the intensions of logically equivalent expres­
sions. This is rather straightforward in cases when two such 
expressions are built up from different non-loglcal constants, 
given that for some interpretation of the non-loglcal cons­
tants, one sentence will have the null-entity as its factual
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value In some world and at some time point, whereas the other 
sentence will not. In some cases, logically equivalent sen­
tences can be distinguished even if they are built up from 
identical non-logical constants. (E.g. Pater loves Mary or 
Peter does not love Mary, versus Mary loves Peter or Mary 
does not love Peter.)
The criterion of the free Interchangeability of two ex­
pressions is not logical equivalence but identity of inten­
sions. It is also possible to define a strong - intensional - 
notion of consequence: A closed expression * has s' as its 
intensional consequence iff every interpretation of f is the 
interpretation of »' as well and every interpretation that 
assigns the value 1 to » also assigns the value 1 to
Let us now turn to the other aspect of the question 
posed in the title. We have seen that value-gap semantics 
does not suffer from the shortcomings Barwlse and Perry crit­
icize Fregean theories of semantics for. What is this theory 
capable of, however, beyond the above distinction between in­
tensions? Is it capable of everything that Situation Seman­
tics has been devised to account for? Naturally, this ques­
tion could only be satisfactorily answered if the range of 
problems to be dealt with in Situation Semantics were well- 
delimited. This not being the case, even the investigation of 
problems analyzed so far would be extremely space-consuming, 
and therefore I will concentrate on two problems in comparing 
the power of the two theories. It is hoped that this compar­
ison will have a more general moral.
In his paper published in The Journal of Philosophy, Jon 
Barwise suggests that the analysis of naked infinitive per­
ception reports is crucial, and given that his handouts for 
the 1983 Salzburg Congress support this view, I will restrict 
my attention to this problem.'5 Let us accept seeing as a par­
adigmatic case of perception.
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Barwlse proposes to interpret a NX perception statement 
"a sees y" as asserting that a sees a scene a that supports 
the truth of a.®
In the formal treatment, *a sees* turns out to be a sen­
tential operator that cannot be iterated. A model for the ex­
tension of classical first order logic that only contains 
this new symbol is obtained by adding, to a model M of first 
order logic, a set of ordered n+2-tuples <P , t>
for every n. The union of these is called S. Pn is an n-ary
predicate, a.,...,a are elements of the domain of quanti- 1 nfication of M, and t 6 {0, 1}. The model of the extended 
language is the ordered pair <M, S>
S y is true in <M, S> iff v is true ln S. This latter a 7notion is recursively definable. The use of S serves to en­
sure that y need not be either true or false in the model but 
may also be neither true nor false. Note that this possibili­
ty is part and parcel to the value-gap conception. The points 
where treatment within Situation Semantics differs from treat­
ment within Rúzsa's theory are as follows:
Ci) For Barwise, it is a necessary and sufficient con­
dition for the truth of the alternation » v f'in S that one of 
its members be true in S. That is, an alternation can be 
"seen" even if one of its members cannot be "seen", i.e. is 
invisible. One of his axioms is as follows:
Sa(? v y ' ) «-♦ Saf v Sa s>
This solution introduces the possibility for adding irrelevant 
members to the alternation. In Rúzsa's theory the value-gap 
is inherited in extensional contexts, wherefore if, say, y 
has the null-entity as its factual value in some world, then 
(y v y') must also have the null-entity as its factual value in 
that world. Thus the addition of irrelevant members is ex­
cluded.
(ii) Another crucial difference concerns the treatment 
of quantification. For Barwlse, the domain of quantification
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is the domain of quantification of first order models, as can 
be seen below:
S==43x * iff S ==l « for all b e 0„f f(b:x) M
Rúzsa's value-gap semantics allows one to define a weaker no­
tion of quantification domain as well. Let Sa be an inten- 
sional functor that forms sentences from sentences. Sa not 
being a logical constant, it will have its own interpretation. 
In order to account for what Barwise calls the logic of non- 
logical expressions, semantic postulates are required. Such 
postulates may be like Barwise's principles, e.g.: If Sg* is 
true in some world at some time point in an interpretation, 
then * Is true in the same world at the same time point in 
that interpretation.
The universal quantification may be handled as follows: 
ii) Let the domain of quantification be the same for every 
world.
(ii) Let the universal quantifier be defined by the following 
equation :
Vx.f(x) =df * - Ux(Up.p) = (Xp.p)))
Thus we get Barwise's quantification rule. The crucial dif­
ference lies in the fact that this latter rule can be weak­
ened. This will be significant whenever we wish to quantify 
over the objects in an actual scene and not over the whole 
model.
Value-gap semantics thus appears to be a framework for 
the description of natural language that is capable of han­
dling the same problems as Situation Semantics and which is 
also set-theoretically well-founded. Situation Semantics, how­
ever, may serve as a better heuristic tool in discovering what 
we really want to handle.
Loránd Eötvös University, Budapest
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IMRE RÚZSA
SEMANTIC VALUE GAPS
0. Preliminariee
According to Frege and Carnap, a well-formed expression 
of a language may have two semantic values called Sinn und 
Bedeutung by Frege [l] and mentioned as intension and exten­
sion by Carnap [2]. In our days, Carnap's terminology is wide­
ly accepted (however, in some writings mostly written in Eng­
lish, one finds 'reference' instead of 'extension'). In most 
cases, 'meaning' and 'intension' are used synonymously, al­
though in some writings the terra 'intension' refers only to 
the set-theoretic representation of meaning (a function from 
possible worlds into a set of extensions). I shall use the 
term 'factual value' instead of 'extension' (since it seems to 
me somewhat perverse to speak of the extension of a sentence 
or an individual name), of course, by the factual value of an 
individual terra I mean the object (if any) denoted by the term 
and by the factual value of a (declarative) sentence I mean 
its truth value (if it has one). The factual value of any ex- 
tensional functor (including predicates) is assumed to be a 
function (in the set-theoretical sense) which may be called 
its extension.
It may happen that a well-formed (meaningful) expression 
of a language has no factual value. I shall use the term'se­
mantic value gap' to refer to this phenomenon. The simplest 
case of a semantic value gap is perhaps a definite description 
without an actual denotation. If such a term occurs in a sen­
tence in a de re position - as in the traditional example 'The 
present king of France is bald' -, then the sentence has no
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truth value (at least, it is claimed to be so by Frege Lll). 
This is an example of the truth value gap (the latter term is 
not unknown in the literature of logic).
However, semantic value gaps are not restricted to names 
and sentences. Some philosophers and some linguists argue 
that there are predicates which are undefined for some ob­
jects. For example, colour predicates are undefined for num­
bers, the predicate 'ruminant' is inapplicable to inanimate 
physical objects, and mathematical predicates (such as 'has a 
quadratic divisor') are undefined for physical objects. Even 
in the language of a science, some predicates and operations 
are partial ones: Think of division in arithmetic, square 
root operation in the field of real numbers, limit operations, 
differentiation and integration of functions in analysis. Ac­
cepting this view, we have new sources of semantic value gaps. 
Moreover, we can distinguish the emptiness of the extension 
and the lack of the extension of a monadic predicate. For ex­
ample, if our domain of individuals is the set of natural num­
bers, then the extension of the predicate 'even prime number 
greater than two' is empty, whereas the predicate 'green' - 
being totally undefined for numbers - has no extension at all. 
Similarly, the predicate 'child of Chronos' has no extension 
in worlds other than that of Greek mythology.
However, since Frege, there has been a constant effort 
to drive out semantic value gaps from the realm of logic. In 
my view, this is the wrong policy. Firstly, it seems that the 
appearance of semantic value gaps is a real phenomenon. Sec­
ondly - and this is the most important argument - a logical 
system permitting semantic value gaps provides a natural 
means for a fine differentiation of meanings. To begin with 
simple examples, we all have learned that pairs of tautologies 
such as "A » A" and ' B s B 1 are not distinguishable in logic, 
both being true in all logically possible worlds (and at all 
moments of time), and hence, their intensions must coincide. 
Similarly, sentences of the form A and "A * (B v -B)* are log-
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icaXly synonymous : their truth values coincide in all logi­
cally possible worlds. Most linguists are not content with 
these results of logic. They argue that there is a significant 
difference between the meanings of these sentences. Now assume 
that there is a logically possible world w in which sentence 
A has a truth value but B has none. Then - assuming that the 
truth value gap is hereditary via truth functions - "B= B" and 
“A S (B v -B>" have no truth value in w, but A is true or 
false and "A m A “ is true in w. By this, our linguists are sat­
isfied: it is possible that "A => A" is, but “B = B" is not, true 
in a world w, and hence, they are not synonymous. Similarly 
for the pair A and "Aï (B y -B)”, Lof course, the case that 
"B=B" is false, or that A is true and "A * (B v -B)n is false 
remains impossible.il As a consequence, it is not automatically 
guaranteed that A and "A & (By -B)* are interchangeable aal-oa 
veritate in all contexts. (They are surely not so as arguments 
of intensional functors such as 'thinks that', 'sees' etc.)
A more striking example: Are the following tautological 
sentences synonymous?
Bill likes or does not like steak.
Steak likes or does not like Bill.
In general: are sentences of the form
"Fab v -Fab” and "Fba v -Fba
synonymous? If we admit the possibility that the two-place 
predicate F is defined (true or false) for the couple <a,b) 
but is undefined for <b,a>, our answer is NO. Here lies the 
advantage of permitting partial functions as factual values 
(extensions) of predicates.
As an objection against accepting partially defined pred­
icates, one might say that it is highly uncertain to limit the 
domain in which a predicate is defined (is true or false).
Most people perhaps agree that 'ruminant' is not defined for 
inert objects, but even these might be confused in answering
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the question whether this predicate is applicable to amoebas 
or protozoa. It seems to be a metaphysical dogma that every 
predicate P has its own 'applicability domain', a domain of 
objects such that P is true or false of them. Is this a 
stronger dogma than the assumption that every predicate has a 
clear-cut truth domain? If you think that the latter is not a 
metaphysical dogma, but an unavoidable idealization for pract­
ising logic, then anyone who (like myself) wishes to maintain 
the use of partially defined predicates will answer that this 
is another (hardly avoidable, but at any rate, useful) ide­
alization for the purpose of better practising logic. More­
over, we can assume that in our actual world, every predicate 
is totally defined (applicable to all assumed existing ob­
jects). To enjoy the benefits of a logic with semantic value 
gaps it is sufficient to assume that there are possible worlds 
in which the factual values of some functors are partial func­
tions. That is, you are requested to accept only the possibil­
ity of partial functions, leaving open the problem of the ac­
tual existence of such functions. However, I should like to 
stress that the notion of partially defined predicates origi­
nates from a linguistic intuition, and hence, it does not 
lack a real, empirical base.
As far as I know, the first formal system permitting 
truth value gaps is A. N. Prior's modal propositional logic Q 
( see T 3 J , Chapter V, and [4], pp. 157-159). Since 1970,1 have made efforts 
to extend Prior's pioneering approach to systems of quantified 
modal logic 15] and to the theory of descriptions in modal 
contexts 16’. In the last six or seven years, I set out to de­
velop a general theory of semantic value gaps in the frame of 
a type-theoretical tensed lntensional logic. My first report 
on this subject was a lecture given at a workshop 1979 (this 
was published only in Hungarian; a Russian version is in 
press). A somewhat modified version in English [7] appeared 
in Studia Logica 1981.
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On these pages, I shall outline a semantic system of 
tensed intensional logic with factual value gaps. Here the 
basic ideas are the same as in my first approach 1979, but 
the details are refined and simplified in several respects. 
Before the systematic exposition, it may be appropriate to 
make a few informal, preliminary remarks.
Concerning type theory, my point of departure is the usu­
al system of extensional types. Thus, o and t are extensional 
types - the types of sentences and individual terms, respect­
ively - and if o and B are extensional types, so is (aß). 
However, I will not introduce a new symbol for senses - 
as R. Montague did in ! 8] - for creating new types of names 
of intensions. Instead, I will distinguish extensional and 
intensional functor types (the latter will be called operator 
types). The latter are defined as follows: if o,ß ,...,6^  are 
extensional types (k >_ 1), then (a; 6^  ... jß^) is an opera­
tor type. In this way, I shall avoid the unlimited iteration of 
intensions which endows Montague's system with a highly pla­
tonic character. The intuitive difference between a functor 
belonging to type (aß) and an operator belonging to type (a;ß) 
is, as one might guess, that the first one operates on the 
factual value, and the second one on the intension, of its 
argument.
As primitive logical symbols, I shall use (besides paren­
theses) the lambda operator (X), the identity sign («), the 
descriptor (I) for forming names from monadic predicates, the 
intensor (-) for forming names of propositions from sentences, 
and two temporal operators 'sines' and 3 till“ . Other connect­
ives (-, S,=, v,) quantifiers, modal operators, and the usual 
past and future tense operators (P, P) can be introduced by 
definitions.
An intensional language may contain nonlogioal constants 
in all extensional and operator types. On the other hand, var­
iables will be permitted only in the extensional types. But I
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shall use two sorts of variables In all extenslonal types 
called extenaional and intentional variables, respectively.
In the metalanguage, I shall refer with Roman letters to the 
extenslonal variables, and with Greek letters to the inten- 
slonal ones. The main difference of the two sorts of variables 
is as follows: an expression of form "(lx A)" is an exten- 
sional functor, whereas "(XÇ A)" is an operator (an inten- 
slonal functor). Thus, if A belongs to type a, and x and ï 
belong to type B, "(lx A)" belongs to type (aB), whereas 
"(AÇ A)" belongs to the operator type (a;B).
An identity "(A « B)" will be accepted as well-formed 
only if the expressions A and B belong to the same extenaional 
type. Quantification will be defined by means of 1-abstraction 
and identity. As a consequence, only extenaional variablea (of 
the extenslonal types) are quantifiable. Intensional variables 
will be proved to be ellminable from closed terms and formu­
las. This means that intensional variables are only auxiliary 
tools which are useful, for instance, for expressing incom­
plete natural language expressions, but they disappear as soon 
as the full sentence is built up.
The basic syntactic operations will be as follows: func­
tional application (forming "C(B)" if C belongs to type (oB) 
or (a;6) and B belongs to type B), l-abstraction, and identi­
fication (mentioned above).
The semantics begins in the usual way. We shall provide 
for all extenaional types a a domain D(a) of factual values 
and a domain Int(a) - ^(a) of intensions where I is an index 
set of form WXT, W is the set of worlds, and T is the set ofin ftime moments. (I use A to denote the set of functions from B 
into A.) As regards operator types, if a,B are extenslonal 
types, the domain of (o;B) will be defined as Int(6^int(o) » 
and so on. Furthermore, a function d defined on W will provide 
the set of actual individuals for all worlds W e W (with the 
proviso d(w)çD(b). Quantification in type b will be restrict-
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ed to d(w) at index i = <w,t> (a remarkable difference from 
Montague's intensional logic).
The factual value of an extensional functor of type (<xB) 
will be a partial function from D(6) to D(o). I assume that 
the factual value gap is hereditary in extensional contexts; 
i.e.rif A and B are well-formed extensional terms, some oc­
currence of B in A does not lie in the scope of an intensional 
operator in A, and B is without factual value at an index i, 
then so is A. The semantic rules are in accord with this as­
sumption. Of course, the value gap need not be hereditary via 
intensional operators; the sentence
John thinks that the wife of the presentPrime Minister of the Ü.K. is a nice lady
may have a truth value.
In the formal semantics, all value gaps will be filled
in by distinguished elements called zero entities. For each
extensional type a, its domain D(a) will contain a zero entity
denoted by 8_.a
If A is a sentence, ■““A" is a term denoting its intension 
and belonging to type c. In accordance with this syntactic 
rule, the domain Die) will include sentence intensions as 
well. The set of actual individuals of the world w - denoted 
by d(w) - always includes all sentence intensions, but it is 
possible that it contains no other (real) objects.
In the last section of this paper, I shall mention an ex­
tension of the system by accepting "(A = B)" as well-formed 
in the case when A and B belong to the same operator type. In 
this way, quantification of intentional variables is defina­
ble. Then, our ontological commitment will be somewhat higher 
than before, but it still remains far from that of Montague's 
system. Iteration of intensions remains impossible.
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1. Type theory
1.1 Typ» symbol»
I will use 'o’ (omicron) and * i’ (iota) for denoting the 
logical type (or category) of the (declarative) sentence« 
(formulas) and (individual) names (terms), respectively. If a 
and B are type symbols, I shall use "(oB)“ for denoting the 
type of axteneional functors which, combined with an argument 
of type 0, yield an expression of type a. Finally, "(058)" 
will denote the type of operators (intenslonal functors) 
which might be combined with arguments of type B to yield an 
expression of type a. More formally and exactly:
The set EXTY is the smallest set of symbols such that:
(i) o.i € EXTY and
(ii) o,B e EXTY — > "(oB)- e EXTY .
And the set OPTY (of operator types) is the smallest set 
of symbols such that
(iii) o,6 e EXTY => "(o;B)" e OPTY and
(iv) (t e OPTY and 8 e EXTY) => ■(t ;8)* e OPTY . 
Finally, the set TYPE of all type symbols is to be
TYPE -df EXTY u OPTY .
Omitting parentheses. I shall write
"(o Bt )’ Instead of "((o B)t )" , and 
"(o ;Bíy)" instead of *((o ;B)t )’ .
Furthermore, I shall omit the outermost parentheses surround­
ing type symbols. For example, I shall write
'ott* instead of '((otK)', and
'nio(oi)’ instead of *((ot);(o(ot)))’ .
1.2 By a type-theoretioal structure let us mean a sixtuple
S - <U,W,T, <, D,d>
where 0, W, T are nonempty sets, < is an ordering on T, D is
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a function with domain TYPE, d is a function from W, and the 
conditions (1) to (vii) below are fulfilled.
[Intuitively: 0 is a set of Individuals, W is a set of 
(labels of) possible worlds, T is a set of time moments, < is 
the relation earlier than (between time moments), the function 
D provides a domain of objects for all extensional and opera­
tor types, and the function d provides a domain of individuals 
for each world w 6 W.’J
(i) T is an infinite set linearly ordered by < without 
first and last members. (One can assume that T is either the 
set of integers, or the set of the rational or the real num­
bers, and < is the usual 'less than' relation between num­
bers. )
(11) If a e EXTY, then D(a) is a set containing a dist­
inguished element 0 called the aero entity of type a. By the 01domain of intensione of type a let us mean the set
Int(o) -d£ Id (o ) where I - WxT .
(ill) D(o) » {0,1,2} » 3, and 0 = 2. (Here 'o’ and 'i'0represent the truth values falsity and truth, respectively, 
and '2' represents the truth value gap.)
(iv) D(t) = Oi/suiD}, and 0^ = 0. (I hope 0 g 0.) (The 
members of 0 may be regarded as primitive physical individu­
als, and the members of *3 may be called sentence intensions. 
In fact, Int(o) = I3.)
(v) If o,6 e EXTY,
D(aS) « {» 6 D(ß)D(a)i f(0 ) = 0 } ,df 8 a
and let 0 be the function such that a8
b e D(6) 0 .(b) = 0 .a p a
(Vi) If a,8 e EXTY,
D(ajB) * Int<8)Int(a) , 
and if t e 0PTY and 8 6 EXTY, then
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D(t,B) S 
(vii) For all w e W,
Int(8)D(T) . 
I 3s d ( w ) £ 0uI 3.
2. Grammar
By an inteneional language let us mean a quintuple
_int . .L - <LC, Var, Con, Op, Cat)
satisfying the following conditions (Gl) to (G5):
CGI) LC is the set of the logical constants of L^nt:
LC •« {(, ), X, =, I, *, since, till).
(G2) Var is the set of variables of Lint:
Var - U a e EXTY (Varext(,)uVarint(.)) 
where V a r « ^ . )  - <*an>neu and Varint(a) « <Çan>n6k,
(G3) Con is the set of (nonlogical) extensional constants 
of Lint:
Con = U a 6 EXTY Con(a)
where Con(a) is a (possibly empty) denumerable set of symbols 
called constant8 of type a.
(G4) Op is the set of (nonlogical) operators (intensional 
constants) of Lint;
°P “ U T e 0PTY Op(T)
where 0p(t ) is a (possibly empty) denumerable set of symbols 
called operators of type a.
(G5) Cat is the set of the well-formed expressions of
Llnt:
Cat “ Cat.extuCat.int,
Cat.ext - U a e EXTY Cat(a), Cat.int - U T g opTy Cat (t ),
where the sets Cat(a) and Cat(t) are inductively defined by 
the items (SI) to (S7) below. For the sake of brevity, the
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category of an expression A will be indicated by writing "Ao" 
E.g., in (S2') below, e Cat(o)« abbreviates the
following text: »If C e Cat(oB) and B e Cat(B), then " C W  
e Cat<a ) . «  .
<S1) O e EXTY -»• Varext(a)u Varlnt(o)w Con(o)e Cat(a); 
and T 6 OPTY ->• Op(r)£ Cat(t ).
(52) a , B e EXTY -*■ "C .(b )" ® Cat(a); andOp p
( t e TYPE, B e EXTY) - *  "C ( B . ) ’  e Cat(T ) .
t : B B
(53) a,B e EXTY -* U x  A )" e Cat(aB); andB a
(t e TYPE, B e EXTY) -* "(^g*,,)’ e Cat(s;B).
[Here x 6 Varext(ß), and ç e Varint(8).]
(54) a 6 EXTY “* "(A0 - Ba)" e Cat(o) .
(55) "JA " 6 Cat(t ).0 c
(56) -AA " e CatU).o
(57) "(A since B )" e Cat(o); "(A till B )" 6 Cat(o).0 0 0 0
Free and bound occurrences of a variable in a term are 
distinguished as usual. Also, open and eloeed terms are de­
fined in the canonical way.
3. Semantics
3.1 Projections
By a projection (or interpreting function) of into a
type-theoretical structure S let us mean a function o on 
Con u Op such that:
(i) if C e ConU), o(C) e U ç D U ) ,
(ii) if C e Con(a), ait, then o(C) e Int(a), and 
(lii) if c e op(i), o(C) e d (t ).
Remark. The constants of type t are to be considered as 
rigid terms (like proper names); this is the reason of the dif-
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ference between clauses (1) and (il). Non-rigid individual 
terns may be expressed as descriptions, see later on.
3.a Assignments
By an assignment (or valuation) of (the variables of)
Llnt in the structure S let us mean a function ▼ on Var such 
that for all a e EXTY, if x e Varext(o), then v(x) e D(o), and 
if C e Varint(a), then v(ç) e Int(a). Given Lint and S, let us 
denote by S(V) the set of all assignments of Var in S. - If 
X e VarextU), a e DU), ç e Varlnt(S), * e lnt(i). v, v ^  
v2 e s(V ), and for z e Var,
(a, if z - x, (♦, if * - C,
V *  >“ I v <z) - 11 lv(z) otherwise; * (v(z) otherwise;
then we write ■vL*:aU’ for v^, and “v LÇî^D* for
Remark. As one sees, the possible values of a variable 
x are factual values of type a, whereas those of ( are in­
tensions of type a. This shows the eemantie difference between 
the two sorts of variables.
3.3 Intensions
Let a and v be a projection and an assignment of Lint
into S, respectively. Por all A e Cat, we define the intensioneof A in S, according to a and v, denoted by "lnt0 V(A)", by
the recursive clauses (ID to (17) below. I shall write
“int (A>* instead of "int® „(A)“ assuming S and o to be fixed.
- If A e Cat.ext, then inty(A) is a function defined on 
I ■ WxT; hence, it can be defined by determining int^iAXi) 
for all 1 e I. I shall use this possibility in some clauses be­
low.
C The category of a metavariable will be indicated by a type 
symbol superscript - as introduced in Sect.2, (G5) - at its 
first occurrence in a rule.3
71
(Il.l) If x 6 Varext(a), then
[e if v(x) e D(t) - de±j_) , 
int (x)(i) “ "I C^v(x) otherwise
where i^ is the first term of the couple i e I. [Of course, 
the case intv(x)(i) “ 0t may occur only if x e Varext(c).
(11.2) If ; e Varint(a), then
(eL if v(ç)(i) e d (v) - d(i ), 
int («Xi) - 1 1 
v [t (()(1) otherwise.
(11.3) If C e Con(c), then
f0 if o(C) * d(i ) , 
int (C)(i) - <! 1 
lo(C) otherwise.
(11.4) If C e Con(a), and af\., then inty(C) = o(C).
(11.5) If C e Op, then int^CC) = o(C).
(12.1) If 4(i) - intv(Cog)(i)(intv(B6)(i), then
int ( f 0 if 4(i) e D U )  - d(i ), *C(B)*)(i) -< t 1
U(i) otherwise.
(12.2) If 4 - int (C )(int (B,), then v a;D v p
int ( Í0. if 4(i) 9 d(i.), ■C(B)*)(i) - <• c 1
v♦(i ) otherwise.
(12.3) If t*l , int C C  (B )") - int (C)(int (B )) .v T , p p v V
(13.1) For all b 6 D(B) - {0g}
int (*(Xx,A )")(!)(b) - int W1(A)(1) , v B o  V£x:b3
and int (*(XxA)“Ci)(0.) . e .v P a
(13.2) For all 4 e Int(ß),
intvC U f 6Aa)-)C*) - intv U s W (A> .
(14) 2 if inty(A)(i) - 0a or inty(B)(i) - 0a,
intv(*(Aa-B)-)(i) - \ 1 if int^AKi) - int (B)(i) f 0O ,
lo  otherwise . T
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(15) intv ("IA0L*)(i) - u0 provided
íu e ddj): intv(A)(i)(u) ■ 1) ■ {uQ};
in other cues intv ( *IA" )(i) 0 .
(16) intvC “Ao*)(i) - int^A)
(17) int^CA, 
where 0 and t are functions on I defined as follows:
aine» Bo>") = ♦, intv ( " U 0 till B0)")e*.
♦ U >  -
2 if for all t<i2, int^CiA - B)")<i1,t> - 2 ,
1 if for some t<i2, intv(B)(i1,t> » 1 and for all t', 
t<t'<i2 _» intT(A)<i1,t»> - 1,
0 otherwise
Lhere i^ and i2 are the first and the second terms of i, 
respectivelyU j
♦ (i)
2 if for all t, l2<t -*• intv(*(A-B)’)<i1,t> - 2,
1 if for some tf intv(B)<i1,t> » 1 and for
all t', i2<t'<t -» intv (A)<i1,t'> - 1,
0 otherwise.
Remark», (i) It is easy to show that if A ß  Cat(o), 
then int^A) e Int(a) provided a e EXTY, and if 
A 6 Cat(x)£ Cat.int, then inty(A) e D(t). - (li) Similarly, 
if A e Cat(k), then for all i e I, intv(A)(i) e d(i^) where 
i1 is the first term of the couple i. The (somewhat compli­
cated) formulation of the group of semantic rules (ID and
(12) will serve to guarantee this. - (ill) Extensional varia­
bles and individual constants as well as names of sentence 
intensions of form *“A * are rigid terms; cf. (II.D ,  (11.2),
(11.3) and (16).
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S.i Taatual values
If A e  Cat.ext, then
lAlvl -df lnV X){1)
will be called the faotual valut of A at i (lei), according 
to S, o, and v. If A e Cat(o)C Cat.ext, then 1aIv1 e D(o).
L Remember that the current term for 'factual value' is 'ex­
tension ' O
Using the notation just Introduced, some of our semantic 
rules is expressible more shortly. E.g.,
(12.1) Íec if Ic |v 1(|b |v1) e D(t) - d(i^), 
llclviC|B|vl) otherwise.
(13.1) |U x BA<.)|vl(b) “ |Alv[x:b] ,1 Provided and
|UxA)|vl(eB) * 0„ •
(16) I*A0IV1 “ lnV X>*
3.& Absolut» intensions
Por A e Cat, int (A) may be regarded as the contextualV
intension of A according to S, o and "the context" v. Of 
course, if A is closed, lnt^(A) does not depend on v. The ab­
solute intension of A (according to S and 0) might be defined 
as a function ||Af| from S(V) by
v e S(V) ||A|l(v) - intyiA) .
[Contextual and absolute Intension is called by Montague 
'sense' and ’meaning', respectively; cf. [83.3
3.1 The central notions of semantics
The couple <S,o> is said to be an interpretation of the 
language Lint iff S is a type-theoretical structure and 0 is 
a projection (an interpreting function) of Lint into S.
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The quadruple <S, a, v, i> Is said to be a rapraaantation 
of the set r ç Cat.ext (of Lint) iff <S,o> is an interpret­
ation of Llnt, v e S(V), i e I - WxT, and for all a e EXTT,
A e r o  Cat(o) |A|S . + e„ .0V1 a
If, in addition,
A e r « Cat(o) 1*1^  “ 1
holds, then we say that <S, o, v, i) Is a modal of T.
Let K be a class of interpretations of Lint, and 
reCat(o). Then T is said to be K-aatiafiabla iff T has a K- 
model ( s ,  o, v, i) where <S,cr> e K. A sentence A e Cat(o) is 
said to be a atrong K-eonaaquanoa of T iff every K-represen- 
tation of r is a representation of {A} and every K-model of T 
is a model of (A); in symbols:
(1) rll-R a.
The sentence A is said to be K-irrafutabla iff for all <S,o>eK
(v e S(V) and i e 1) -*■ IAIS + O<7V1
holds. Further, A is said to be K-valid Iff A is a strong K- 
consequence of the empty class of sentences; in symbols:
(2) ||-K A.
Terms B and C are said to be K-aynonymoua iff they belong to 
the same (extensional or intensional) category, and for all 
(.S,a> € K, y B|| g «= 11C [I ® (i.e., iff their absolute Intensions
coincide in all K-interpretations). We denote this relation by
(3> A = ? B '
If K is the class of all interpretations of L , we omit the 
subscript 'k ' in the notations (1), (2), and (3).
A weak consequence relation will be introduced later on.
Ramark. If A e Cat.ext, then *(A»A)* is K-irrefutable
(for every class K of interpretations), but it need not be
K-valid (for |(A“A)|S « 2 might be possible). However,ovt
■(Ux x) » (lx x))* ie valid (i.e., K-valid for all class K).
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4. Some semantical metatheorems 
I Proofs will be omitted throughout.']
4.1 The law of replacement
Assume that A, B belong to the same category, A Is a part 
of C e Cat , and denote "C[B//A]' the term obtained from C 
by replacing an occurrence of A not preceded immediately by 
'x' by B. Then:
(A =  B) -» IC =  CCB//A])
for all class K of interpretations of L^n*".
Let us say that B is substitutable for the (extensional 
or intentional) variable n in A iff n and B belong to the same 
Cextensional) type, A e Cat , and whenever t is a variable 
occurring free in B, and "(XçC)" is a part of A, then no free 
occurrence of n in A stands in "(XçC)". Let us denote by 
■A[B/nJ” the term obtained from A by substituting B for all 
free occurrences of rt.
4.2 The law of intentional lambda-conversion
If B is substitutable for the intentional variable Ç in 
A, then
U Ç A X B )  =  ALB/Ç] .
Corollary : The eliminability of intentional variables. If 
A e Cat.ext is a closed term, then there is a term A' con­
taining no intensional variables such that 
A =  A' .
A term B € Cat.ext is said to be a rigid one iff 
intv(B) is always a constant partial function on I. Rigid 
terms are the extensional variables, the constants of type i, 
the sentence-intension names of form "*A0"» and all exten­
sional terms involving only bound variables and logical con-
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stants (e.g., *((Xx x) *■ (Xx x))*.
By an intensional operator let us Bean any term of 
Cat.Int as well as any of the logical constants ainoe, till, 
and the lntensor
4.3 Tha lay of exteneional lambda-oonvaraion
Assume that the axtensional variable x has some free oc­
currence in A e Cat.ext, B is substitutable for x in A, and 
one of the following two conditions if fulfilled:
(i) No free occurrence of x in A is a part of an argument 
of an intensional operator.
(il) B is a rigid term.
Then
except when |b Iví ” 0g in which case the left side of (4) is 
9a (provided A e Cat(a), B e Cat(B)). This the reason of the 
stipulation that x must have some free occurrence in A.
The term A e Cat.ext is said to be pure exteneional if it 
involves no intensional operators and no intensional varia­
bles.
4.4 The hereditaryneee of factual value 
gape in exteneional contexte
Assume that A € Cat(a)£ Cat.ext, A is pure extensional,
B e Cat(B), B is a part of A, and no free variable of B is 
bound in A. Then:
for all interpretations <S,o), for all v e S(V), and for all
1 e i.
(4)
U x  A) (B) =  a [b /x] .
Remark. If x does not occur free in A, then 
|Ux A)<B)vi - |A|vl
S
ovi 9. “4 |A|
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5. Definition of elaeaioal oonneotivea and operatora
[In the following definitions, the category of a meta­
variable will be indicated by a type symbol subscript at its 
first occurrence. Some parentheses will be omitted if no mis­
understanding arises by their omission.J
S.J The symbols V ,  '+ and (Verum, Falsum, and 
Negation, respectively) are to be introduced as follows:
+ "df ■(AP0p) “ U P-P>"> ♦ “df ’(iPoP) * (Xp.f)■;
- “df "AP0<P~O";Ay Vwhere p is the first member of Var (o).
He write
■A * B" for *~(A » B)" .
5.2 and 'F' (past and future tense-operators) are 
defined as follows:
P -df *X»0(+ ainoe *)"; P =df "X»0(t till »)"; 
where * is the first member of Varint(o).
5.3 The modal operatora 'D' and 'O' (necessity, possib­
ility) are defined by:
□  -df •X«0(“v - '+)", 0 -d£ "Xw0(*» * *(»*»))",
where * is as above. Note that "-^(*a )" and "0(A)’ are not 
synonymous, and that 13(A)* and "0(A)" never take 2 as their 
factual value.
5.4 Quantifiera. If C e Cat(oa), the formula
(C - XXa+)
expresses that the (perhaps higher-order) predicate C holds
true for all members of D(a), whereas
(C - Xx (Cx « Cx))<1
expresses that C is falee for no members of D(o). Ein a 
semantic without value-gaps, the two formulas are synonymous,] 
It is the latter which we shall call the universal quantific-
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ation of C. However, in tbe case a = i, we want to restrict 
quantification to d(i^) instead of D(c). By this, the general 
definition of the quantifier Va (of type a) is as follows:
V, *XPoaCxxa((x-x) - Px) = Xx((x»x) « (Px - Px))]".
If , this is synonymous with the shorter one:
V a *df *XPoa£p “ X*«<Px “
Here P is the first member of Varext(oa) .
Now we can introduce the following abbreviations:
"Vxa .A0- for * X U x «'Ao>".
for •~VXa.~Ao",
for *iaxc.Ao)* .
We then have the following valuation rule:
lVa-Ao Vi
|2 if for all a e D(a), |A|v rxsa]fl - 2 , 
• 0 if for some a e D(a), l*lv[x:aj,i “ °' 
1 otherwise.
In the case "a e D(a)" is to be replaced here by
*a e d(l^)*.
Now we can introduce (conjunction) as Montague did in
[8]:
4 “df "XP0-Xq6-Vh0 0[p * <hp “ ^  " 
where h is the first member of Varext(oo), and p, q are the 
first two members of Var (o). Of course, we write *Aq t B0" 
instead of "íCA^CB^". if one of A, B takes the factual value 
2, then so does *A i B*.
The functors 'v' and 's' can be introduced by using '*»'
and 't' as usual. We do not need the biconditional, since
"(A_ - B„)* does the same job.0 0
S.S Subordination. Let us note that if B, C e Cat(oo),
then
V Xa(Bx » Cx)
does not mean that all B's are C's. [it only means that no B's
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belong to the falsity-domain of C; i.e., it Is not excluded 
that C Is undefined for some B's.J To express the latter, we 
will introduce the functors ’eui>a'.
Assume P S Varex (^o<x) and x 6 Varex^(a). Noting that 
both are rigid terms, we have that for all assignments v, 
if for some j e I, |Px|v  ^- 1, then for all i e I,
|Px|vi ■ 1
with the proviso that in the case a»u, v(x) € d(i^). Hence:
I 1 if IpxIv1 -
lOiPxll i - -j
( 0 otherwise
(with the same proviso as above). He then define: 
suba -df 'ip0aiQ0OV R 0a[(R “ 0) - V x a(PX 
where P, Q, R are the first three members of Varext(oo).
He write "B0a»ui> Coo" Instead of "eui>a(BoaH C oa). Then 
"B eub C* abbreviates the formula
VRoaL(R - C)=>Vxa(Bx30(Rx))J
which takes the value
2, if the factual value of B or of C is 0 „ ,
1, if all B's are C's, and 
0 in the remaining cases.
Note that
"B sub C" and "(lx.-Cx) eub (Ix.-Bx)" 
are not synonymous. The same holds for
"B sub Xx(Cx » ~Cx)" aiid “C aub Xx(Bx v ~Bx)" .
Thus, if we translate a sentence of the form "Every B is a C" 
as "B eub C", we get that the following tautological sen­
tences! are not synonymous:
Every boy is or is not a pupil.
Every pupil is or is not a boy.
Again, this is a remarkable result of value-gap semantics.
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A final abbreviation:
"Boa '<?“ coo’ stands for "<Bea ,ub Coa> * <c ,ub B)*‘
5.5 Weak eoneequenoe. Let K be a class of interpret­
ations of Lint, r=Cat(o), and A e Cat(o). We say that A is 
a weak K-ooneequenoe of T (denoted by V  f=R A") iff the set 
Tu {-A} has no K-models. - Note that the weak K-consequences 
of the empty set are just the K-lrrefutable formulas; thus, 
the K-irrefutability of A can be denoted by " A*.
5.7 A new law of exteneional lambda. Assume A e Cat(o), 
x e Varext(ß), B e Cat(B), and x does not occur free in B. 
Then:
h U x . A H B )  - 3 x(x - B. » A)
5. Extended inteneionality
The semantics explained on the previous pages makes our 
ontological commitment to admit intensional objects as moder­
ate as it is possible at all. A shortcoming of the system: 
the metalanguage statement *intv(A) * intv(B)* is not express­
ible in the object language if A, B 6 Cat.int. (If A,B e 
Cat.ext, then
“(A - A) « '*'(B - B) S "(A - B) * *(A = A)
is suitable for expressing their synonymity.) The way of the 
correction is obvious: let us extend the syntactic rule (S4)
- the use of identity symbol - for intensional terms:
(S41) If A,B e Cat(T)£ Cat.int, then "(A » B)" e Cat(o).
The corresponding semantic rule:
(141) if T e OPTY, then
I<At “ b t )lvi
if int (A) - int (B) , v v
otherwise.
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The increase in our ontological commitment is clearly indic­
ated by the fact that our intensional variables became quan­
tifiable: if C e Cat(o j ß) and ç e Varlnt(B), then
(C - (XÇ.+))
expresses that C holds true for all 4 e Int($). Thus, we can 
write
■VÇg.Âo" for ■UtgA0) - (XÇ + ) .
Of course, the intensional variables are no longer eliminable 
Another advantage of the extended use of Identity is that 
one can quantify in type u on Und(w) (remember that D(k) =
U u r3u {0}) . Let us call the members of Und(w) the real 
objecte of the world w 6 W. We define:
real -df *(XxV»o (x i ~*))' ,
where * and x are the first members of Varint(o) and Varext(t)
respectively. Then
Vx (reaI(x)»A ) k o
or, in a stronger form,
real eub ( X* A ) k o
expresses the universal quantification of A over the real ob­
jects of d(w). Let us note that if d(w) contains no real ob­
jects, i.e., d(w) » I3, and i *= <w,t>, then
i 3 x t < r e a Z ( x ) ) | v i  = °- 
Loránd EOtvSs University, Budapest
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KORNÉL SOLT
ARGUMENTS AGAINST ATEMPORAL DEONTIC LOGICS
l. Introduction
1. Norms and codes of norms "exist" in time. They are
valid over a period of time t-t‘ (t<t'), after which they be­
come invalid. A particular norm (or code) is not valid before 
a certain t and after a certain t‘. Acts regulated by norms 
are also performed in time. The addressee of a norm acts in 
accordance with it - or fails to do so - in the course of time. 
Therefore, I believe the only adequate way of representing 
norms logically is through temporal deontic logic. I agree 
with those who think it necessary to make a link between de­
ontic logic and temporal logic. There are now more and more 
authors who share this view, for example, P.S. GREENSPAN [6], 
H-N. CASTANEDA [4], '5j, J, LYONS [7], and R.H. THOMASON [18].
I Intend to examine here the temporal relations between 
some components of norms, and the "position" of norm-regulated 
acts in time. Through this, I will be able to support my view 
that atemporal deontic logic cannot in principle provide ade­
quate means to describe certain features of norms and of acts 
regulated by norms.
2. My point of departure is a conception of G.H. von 
WRIGHT to the effect that every norm can be related to a cor­
responding deontic statement, true or false, with which it is 
semantically equivalent: i.e. the prescriptive character of 
the norm is semantically preserved.1 Accordingly, a universal 
legal norm like "Loans ought to be repaid* can be "translated" 
into the deontic statement "It is obligatory for the addressee 
to repay the loan." (For brevity's sake, in this essay, I will 
also call a deontic statement a norm.)
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The operator "0" will here be used exclusively In the 
prescriptive sense.2 Thus 0(— ) approximately means that “The 
addressee is obliged to act 30 that the statement in brackets 
be true." (In standard deontic logic: Op.)
Drawing on von WRIGHT'S idea again, I distinguish between 
categorical norms and those which are conditional.^ A cate­
gorical norm has no conditions or, to be more precise, it only 
has the pseudo-condition that it be performable. A conditional 
norm, on the other hand, also has some "real" conditions. (An 
example of a categorical norm: "A promise ought to be kept"; 
and a conditional norm: "If you cause damage, you ought to 
repair it.")
The present investigation is only concerned with concrete 
norms, i.e. norms deducible from universal norms with respect 
to a particular addressee. (The universal norms of codes are 
or are not fulfilled by the individuals' acts.)
Among deontic operators, only "0" is used here, so the use 
of the symbols P and P will not cause ambiguity. The latter 
are here not deontic but tense operators in the same sense as 
in the RESCHER-ORQUHART system K. . [lljD
2. Th« inhärent present-tenaeneae of the operator "0"
3. To my knowledge, Hector-Neri CASTANEDA was the first 
to point out the inherent presentness of "0". He formulated 
this as "the principle of the present-tenseness of ought", 
meaning that "... times and tenses change around 'ought'...", 
While "'ought' remains an unmovable bastion". Indeed, norms 
are always uttered in the present tense. The prescriptive 
operator "O" has neither past nor future tense.
4. If we formulate the three tenses of 0(— ) we obtain:
(1) P0(— ) "It was obligatory for the addressee to act
in such a way* /
(2) 0(— ) "It is now obligatory for the addressee to
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act in such a way"
(3) po(__) "It will be obligatory for the addressee to
act in such a way."
Among the three statements (2) is the only one with a 
normative content, while (1) and (3) are merely descriptive. 
If (1) is true, then it is a statement about something which 
was a norm. If (3) is true, then it is a statement about 
something which will be a norm (e.g. a bill in Parliament). 
Applying the tense operators to the symbol "Op" in standard 
deontic logic, we get the non-standard symbols POp, Op, and 
POp, of which only the second one is prescriptive, the other 
two being descriptive. No atemporal instrument of logic can 
distinguish between the three versions.
3. Categorical norme and time
5. A norm can only prescribe that a future act be per­
formed by the addressee, after the moment of its uttering. 
Neither acts in the oast, nor those already completed in the 
present, can be prescribed “now" by any norm. No norm can 
prescribe that the present be different from what it is. Con­
sequently, it would be a mistake to symbolize a categorical 
norm by using "Op". The prescriptive formula 0(— ) and its 
argument are never synchronical.5 The performance (or vio­
lation) of a norm is always posterior to its utterance. Atem­
poral standard deontic logic contemplates norm-regulated 
"events" in their eternal synchronity, although these events 
are always diachronical and not synchronical. For this reason, 
I put forward the following formulation for a categorical norm 
instead of "Op":
(4) OFp
Explication: "It is obligatory for the addressee to act 
so that p become true in the future."
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The "norm" Op ("0" being interpreted prescriptively) 
obliges the addressee to accomplish something which is impos­
sible to perform: "The addressee ought to render p true even 
when the truth-value of p has already been fixed as either 
true or false.” Thus, in “Op”, the operator "0" can only have 
a descriptive meaning: "Op" furnishes factual information 
regarding p ’s present deontic status, it belonging to that set 
of tilings which are obligatory. It simply informs us that an 
act p performed by the addressee in the present is, according 
to the code, obligatory in a descriptive sense.
6. Deontic logic is an "offshoot” of alethic modal logic. 
There is definitely a great deal of similarity between deontic 
and modal operators, and the analogy proved very useful to 
deontic logic at its beginning. Nevertheless, there are also 
many differences between the two logics, and heavy emphasis on 
the analogies is bound to be detrimental to deontic logic.
The difference between deontic and modal logic is signif­
icant with regard to our problem as well, since it seems that 
a deontic statement cannot be completely expressed in atempo­
rel terms, while a modal statement lends Itself easily to the 
atemporal approach. For exemple,
(5) Op A p
seems to make no sense if "0" is telken normatively, 
because it prescribes the performance of an act which it 
simulteuieously claims to have been performed already.
(6) Np A p,
however, makes sense, for there is no successive rela­
tion between fp and p.
4. Tha ratroaativa foroa
7. It happens (mainly in the field of legislation) that a 
code or a norm is introduced with a retroactive force (Cf.
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e.g. V. PESCHXA [lo]). That is to say, a code C becomes 
effective at t3 , but it prescribes that its norms be applied 
to acts performed at an earlier period t-t3.
Norms (or codes) cannot have any retroactive force in the 
prescriptive sense. When, for example, a code C2 comes into 
force at t3 with a retroactive effect covering the period 
t-t3 , it would be absurd to assume that the code makes its 
addressees act in the past t-t3 in a way different from that 
in which they actually did. It rather means that the bodies 
entrusted with the application of C2 (such as courts of jus­
tice) are obliged (note here the genuine prescription) to 
judge certain past acts, performed by the addressees between 
t and t3 , on the basis of the new code Cj' Instead of on the 
than effective code C^.
The retroactive force of Cj is a "descriptive charac­
ter". This force changes ax poet faoto the deontic status of 
the acts performed earlier by the addressees, that is, be­
tween t and t', If a prescription ln C2 is more rigid than 
the corresponding prescription in , then an act which, ac­
cording to C^, was not obligatory during t-t3 is later con­
sidered as one "the addressee ought to have performed" (and 
the addressee may eventually be punished for failing to per­
form it.
The retroactive effect of a norm cannot, therefore, be 
described through atemporal logic.
£. Performance or non-parformanoe of a
eategorioal positiva norm in the course of time 8
8. Among categorical concrete norms, I will deal exclu­
sively with commands which are positive norms prescribing 
acts. I am not concerned here with prohibitions.
When a categorical positive norm OFp has been uttered, 
the addressee faces the alternative of either doing p or not 
doing p. He finds himself in a situation of choice. He must
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decide which path to follow: the one which leads to p or the 
one which leads to -p. Let us see these possibilities repre­
sented in a K, time diagram:D
Fig. 1
In the diagram, tQ signifies the actual present, i.e.
’now* (mP ), the moment when the norm OPp is uttered. Let us 
suppose that the norm ought to be performed at . The figure 
demonstrates the two possible alternatives. If the addressee 
follows the lower course, he performs the norm, whereas if he 
follows the upper one, he fails to perform it (in other words, 
he violates it). The lower double line in the figure indicates 
the future, so the diagram shows the lower version to be a 
fact. In the two “critical points of time’, the truth-values 
of some of the more Important statements are given. Mote that 
when p assumes the value true in t  ^ (the addressee performs 
the norm), then, at the same time, OPp becomes false (the norm 
ceases to be valid). As a result of its performance, the con­
crete positive norm ’disappears’.7 (This obviously does not 
hold for universal norms and concrete prohibitions. ) 9*
9. But how are we to show, at t^, that the addressee has
performed a valid positive categorical norm?
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Like this:
(7) POFp * p
An exact formulation of this information is not possible 
by means of atemporal deontic logic. Expressed in the symbols 
of standard deontic logic,
(8) Op i p
does not mean the same as (7), for (8) states simultaneously 
that p ought to be true and that p is already true. Similar­
ly, the realization that a valid categorical norm has been 
violated by the addressee is not expressed by the conjunction 
Op í -p, because of the simultaneity of its components.
S. Future contingency
10. While, in the rest of this article, I use the terms 
"necessary", "impossible", and "contingent" in the logical 
sense, in this and the next sections (7 and 8) I will refer to 
them in the physical sense.
A norm can only regulate contingent acts, which, thus,Omay or may not be performed, No norm can prescribe something 
necessary (for that would be fulfilled in any case) or impos­
sible (since that cannot be fulfilled).
Acts regulated by norms are situated, firstly, in the gfuture and, secondly, in contingency. Accordingly, the ob­
ject regulated is always something in the "contingent future". 
But what is meant by this much disputed philosophical concept? 1
11. Bow is contingency situated in the future? How can 
the future be said to "branch off"? What is branching? Is it 
time itself - in the future? Or the events?10 Or, rather, 
the possibilities?1* I think it is the possibilities. Time 
does not branch off, even in the future, because both the 
past and the future are linear, unlike the system Ï,• ThereDare no alternatives on the real time line.
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When we have progressed from "now* (t) to some t‘ and we 
“look back*, we see the “line" of a single past left behind. 
There is one single future (“the* future) in the same way as 
there is one single present and one single past. (In real 
time, there i n  no ontlc uncertainties.) This has been suc- 
cintly stated by Bertrand RUSSELL:“We all regard the past as 
determined simply by the fact that it has happened; but for 
the accident that memory works backward and not forward, we 
should regard the future as equally determined by the fact 
that it will happen.* ([12], p.146) - “If you already know 
what the past was, obviously it is useless to wish it differ­
ent. But also you cannot make the future other than it will 
be;...“ “...the future is determined by the mere fact that it 
will be what it will be...* ( [l2j, p.147).
Indeed, the future can no more be changed into something 
else than the present or the past.
12. Does it then follow from this conception of “one 
single future“ that the future is pre-determined? Certainly 
not. (If it did, then norms would make no sense.)
There are events which must necessarily occur in the fu­
ture and there are other “events“ whose occurrence in the fu­
ture is impossible. (These are the two areas in which norms 
are ineffective.) But there are also events whose occurrence 
in the future is neither necessary nor possible (i.e. they 
are contingent). That the future “will be what it will be“ 
may well be true, but it is never pre-determined (within the 
boundaries of the necessary and the impossible) what it it 
that will b
This is the area «Aich, as seen from the present, is 
open to alternatives. Among the events or acts that are 
“waiting* in the future, it is the active subject who chooses 
the ones he performs at a given “now“. This is the sphere 
where norms are meaningful and significant, the sphere of 
responsibility. Where we are free, we are responsible. It is
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precisely the function of norms to motivate the addressees 
into "choosing” and performing the contingent future acts 
which are ordered by the code.
Here, X have tried to point out that the conception of a 
"single linear future" is not necessarily connected with the 
idea of a "pre-determined future". However, I see this as 
only a preliminary approach to the concept of the "contingent 
future", as I believe it still requires further analysis.
7. The vagueness of future oontingenay
13. Necessary future events are ab ovo on the line of the 
future (that is, we are unable to prevent them from occurring)., 
On the other hand, events of the "contingent future* are not 
on the line of the future: they are either brought onto the 
line by us or they are not. In the latter case, they are not 
in the future in any real sense of time, as such events are 
only situated on the line of an imaginary future.
Temporal logic often mentions "factual future" as opposed 
to that future which is not factual, i.e. never realized 
(e.g. McARTHOR [8]). Such phrases are misleading because the 
future is always "factual", or else it is no future at all. 
The future which is not "factual" is no future in any real 
sense of the word.
14. Let us suppose that at t ("now"), I am dropping a 
metal ball from Elizabeth Bridge into the Danube. The event 
we can call "the metal ball hits the surface of the Danube" 
will happen at time i', but, already at *, it is ontologioal- 
ly oertain that the above event will happen at t‘, The case 
is different with a contingent event which has not yet taken 
place. Such an event may be, for example, that John Smith 
repays a loan to Peter Brown at t‘. it is ontologioally un­
certain at t that the event will take place at t*. It remains 
uncertain until t‘ . At t, John Smith faces an open altema-
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tive which is only closed at t* . (He ourselves close our open 
alternatives with our decisions and acts, rightly or wrongly.)
The truth-conditions of the following two statements are 
analogous:
(9) "The metal ball will hit the surface of the Danu­
be" , and
(10) "John Smith will repay the loan to Peter Brown".
But there is a fundamental difference between them: (9), 
unlike (10), already has a definite truth-value for t at t. 
The truth-value of (10) for t will only be determined at t‘ 
(post feeta), with a retroactive effect on t. During the 
interval t-t*, the truth-value of (10) for t has not yet been 
ontologically determined. As Richmond H. THOMASON writes: 
"Future contingencies are neither true nor false." ( [19J, p. 
192). This assertion is basically true, if one adds the 
restriction that a statement in the "contingent future" has 
no truth-value during period t-t‘. This is precisely where 
the openneea of the contingent future manifests.
In fact, the phrase "open alternative" is a pleonasm, 
since there is no alternative which is not open. What is 
"closed" cannot be an alternative. It is a necessary precon­
dition to the existence of an alternative that the future 
have at least two possible'’scenarios’, each of which should 
have the chance of being realized.
15. Throughout the history of mankind, the realm of 
physical contingency has expanded as man has extended his 
control over nature, society and himself. This is illustrated 
in Figure 2, where "necessary", "impossible" and "contingent" 
are used in the physical sense:
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Fig. 2
In Fig. 2, at t9 there are both events which were neces­
sary and others which were contingent before their occurrence.
To the left of t on the real time line are found the past oevents which occurred necessarily amd others which were real­
ized (performed) out of contingency. To the right of tQ only 
necessary events are on the line of real time.These qualify as 
future events *in advance*. Beside the line of real time, we 
find imaginary time. To the right of the vertical broken line 
of *now*, in the space between impossible events amd the line 
of the real future (sector B), the so-called 'contingent fu­
ture events* are "waiting for their turn*. They tend to neve 
towards the "now line*. (1) Some of them become necessary in 
a nearer future. (2) Others become actual in a real *now* amd 
will ’eventually* have a place on the real time line, becoming 
real past events. For the rest of them, there is no "now* in 
which they become actual. (3) Some events become impossible 
already in the future. (4) others, after having crossed the 
*now* line, fall into the blank area to the left, between im­
possible events and the line of the real past (sector A). They 
are ’events* which could have occurred, but did not, at an ear­
lier point of time. (The four kinds of possible ‘courses* of
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NECESSARY OR CONTINGENT '° NECESSARY FUTUREI
PAST PRESENT
events emerging from "future contingency" are illustrated in 
Fig. 2. by the four arrows.)
16. It seems that the terra "contingent future* is also 
misleading, for it expresses a self-contradictory concept: 
namely, if an imaginary event is already a future event at t, 
then it is not contingent, and, conversely, if it is contin­
gent, then it is not yet a future event at t. A "future con­
tingency" in the process of occurring is no longer future, it 
only used to be so. On the other hand, a "future contingency" 
that fails to occur is not future and never has been, as it 
is no "future" in any sense of the real future. These are, I 
believe, the characteristic features of "future contingency" 
which earn be, and are meant to be, influenced by norms.
B. Conditional eonoreta norma and time
17. A conditional norm prescribes some sort of acts when 
a certain condition obtains. There are several types of con­
ditional norms. I only intend to examine here the type whose 
condition is a deontically indifferent contingent event which 
has not yet occurred.
It is an ever-disputed question in deontic logic as to 
how the structure of a conditional norm can be precisely for­
mulated using symbolic notation. The problem does not lie 
with the symbols, but with our insufficient knowledge of the 
facts. Among the attempts to solve this problem, I accept 
those which employ a quasi-alethic modal operator to express 
a conditional norm.^ The "main operator" in a conditional 
norm cannot be deontic in the usual sense: it is a special 
alethic modal operator. A conditional norm does not prescribe 
any action until its condition arises. It can be neither per­
formed nor violated as long as its condition does not obtain. 
Therefore, a formula representing a conditional norm cannot 
begin with the normative operator "0".
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18. I think that a conditional norm makes a special state­
ment about the categorical norm it contains.14 It "merely* 
conveys the information that 'within the spatial, temporal 
and personal range of the given code C, it must be considered 
necessarily true that, if a certain condition obtains, then a 
certain categorical norm will become valid." By symbolizing 
the phrase in italics (the special alethic operator) with 
"Io* (briefly meaning "necessary with respect to the code Cm), 
a conditional concrete norm can be expressed as
(11) LglFq D FOFp)
The operator "I " establishes the special alethic modal 
status of the sentence in brackets and prescribes that the 
addressees of the code should consider the phrase in brackets 
true. Consequently, if the contingent condition obtains, the 
categorical norm OFp necessarily comes into effect. OFp in
(11) only becomes valid if its condition arises.15
19. In the case of conditional norms, too, the "events" 
are seen in strict sequence, and not synchronlty. The con­
dition either becomes actual or not at a time after the ut­
tering of the conditional norm. Until it becomes actual, no 
obligation follows from the conditional norm. If it comes to 
obtain, the addressee will, at a later point of time, either 
perform the norm (which has now become actual) or not. Such 
aspects of sequence cannot be formulated in atemporal deontic 
logic.
Take, for example, the following sequence of events:
1. the conditional norm becomes effective; 2. the condition 
becomes actual; 3. the addressee performs the now actual cat­
egorical norm. This sequence of events is not expressed prop­
erly by the formula
(12) ((g D Op) S q) i p
because this conjunction, formulated in standard deontic log­
ic, asserts the simultaneous truth of its components whereas
96
16events 1., 2. and 3. are not simultaneous.16 But if, for 
example, we state the following at tQ (that is, the time of 
uttering (11)):
(13) U alFq ZFOFp) * Fq) t FFp ,
then we have a formula which seems to be an exact prognostic 
statement about the above sequence of events.
20. bet us suppose that 1. the conditional norm (11) is 
uttered at tQ , and 2. its condition becomes actual at t^, and
3. the addressee of the norm performs it at t2. The sequence 
(course) of these events is illustrated in Fig. 3 in a ^  
time diagrams
Fig. 3
In the diagram, the lower double line represents real time. 
In the three "critical points of time", the truth-values of
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some of the more important statements are given. (Note that 
the obtaining of the condition "actualizes* the categorical 
norm OFp at t^.)
21. My endeavour was to investigate some aspects of the 
relation of norms and time (tenses). I have sought to clarify 
my view that no adequate logical description of norms can be 
given using "static*, atemporal means.17 Such a description 
would require dynamic tools stemming from a combination of 
deontic and temporal logics.
Technical University, Budapest
NOTES
1. G.H. von WRIGHT [21j , pp. 93-106
2. On the two interpretations of the operator 'O’, see
E. BULYGIN ’3], p. 127. In E. STENIUS [17], we find two
different symbols: 'O' for the "factual "O' and '0 ' for f nthe "normative".
3. G.H. von WRIGHT [2l] , p. 74
4. H-N. CASTANEDA [4], p. 783
5. J. LYONS thoroughly analyses the relations of precedence 
between utterance and performance of norms. However, I 
cannot agree with his view that the utterance of a norm 
can be simultaneous with its performance: "the world-state 
in which the obligation holds cannot precede, though it 
may be simultaneous with, the world state ... in which the 
obligation is imposed." _7], Vol.2, p. 824
6. It is no doubt morally objectionable if a norm, stricter 
than its predecessor, has a retroactive force.
7. This has been pointed out by P.S. GREENSPAN. Commenting
on her idea, H-N. CASTaSe da remarks: "the ought disappears 
once the truth of its fulfilment, or non-fulfilment, is 
fixed." [4], p. 784. Let me point out that if the truth-
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value gap Is allowed, OPp does not become false, but 
meaningless at t'.
8. What the norms regulate are never possible but contingent 
events, since the former also Include necessary events.
(Note that Aristotle's distinction between SuvatSv - pos­
sible - and tvScxónevov - contingent - only becomes clear- 
cut from Chapter 13, Book I of the First Analytic on. Cf.
SZALAI, S. [1], p. 89)
9. J. LYONS emphasizes the close link between norms and the 
future: "...there Is an intrinsic connection between deontlc 
modality and futurity." [7], Vol.2, p.824
10. Cf. RESCHER, N .—URQUHART, A. [ll]
11.On modalities and time, see McARTHUR, R.P. [8], and on 
modalized future, SMIRNOV, V.A. [l6]
12. s. SZALAI writes: "...If a fact is only realized, through 
its contingency, in the future, then a statement in the 
future tense about a fact, uttered before it is realized, 
is not ab ovo and definitely true. Therefore it is not 
necessary at the moment of its utterance." [l], p.89, n7
13. E.g. ROZSA, I. [14], p.114
14.1 disagree with von WRIGHT on whether "We could also say 
that a hypothetical norm does not contain a categorical 
norm as a part." [2l] , p.170
15.A norm which is "not actual" is, in fact, self-contradic­
tory, for something which is not actual is not obligatory 
and, hence, not a norm. (On the actuality of norms, see 
ROZSA, I. [13], p.154)
16.Of course, (12) is also incorrect, because the material 
conditional cannot be employed to express the logical 
structure of a conditional norm. It is curious how even 
recently J. BERKEMANN for example, treated the problem 
of the negation of a conditional norm as if g oOp expressed 
one. [2], p.191
17.j. TOMBERLIN has reviewed unsuccessful attempts at resolv­
ing the "contrary-to-duty imperative paradox". [l9j All of
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the attempts employed atemporal logic, in spite of the 
important role time plays in the four premises of the 
paradox and in their two contradictory conclusions. (An 
example of an atemporal approach is P. MOTT's article.
[9]
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VILMOS SŐS
THE CERTAINTY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE TRUTH
The exact meaning of the term “truth* greatly depends on 
what it Is meant to be used for. The word truth might mean a 
number of things in the scientific and in the ordinary lan­
guage as well.
As far as the philosophical term “truth’ is concerned,
I would like it to be applied to statements.
The word “true" is used more or less in the following 
way: “It is true that Peter is tall*, “This statement is true“, 
“The statement that Peter is tall is true*.
Sometimes a sentence can also be regarded to be true, 
but in that case, it is always the statement incorporated in 
the sentence which is referred to. A sentence is made in 
words, a statement however, is just made with words. We can 
say of a sentence that it is not an English sentence or that 
it is not a correct English sentence, but in the case of a 
statement we cannot say the same, we can only say that it has 
not been told in English or it has not been told in correct 
English. A statement is told or expressed, while a sentence 
is used. I can say that “It is my statement“, but I cannot say 
that “It is my sentence*. The very saune sentence can express 
a number of entirely different statements. A sentence like 
“This suitcase is mine" may be said by two different persons, 
but then these two sentences have obviously two different 
meanings. And likewise the other way round: we can express the 
very saune statement by different sentences. For example, 
speaking of John you might say that “He is ill*, or speaking 
to him I can say that “You are ill*, or John cam say to any of 
us that “I am ill*. These are different sentences and, what 
is more, they have different meanings, still all the three as-
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sert the same, all the three state that ‘John Is ill*. It is 
exactly in this sense that it is only a statement that can be 
true or false.
Let us look at some other statements as well: ‘The cat 
is mangy", "The man whom she had supper with was a tall one 
with a good pronunciation" etc. When we use such sentences 
referring to a thing or a person, we state something with 
which we mean to characterize the thing or person in question. 
A statement has a descriptive and a referring part. The refer­
ring part Indicates whom or what the statement refers to. The 
descriptive part characterises that which the statement re­
fers to. The statement is not identical with the description 
or the reference either; it is a peculiar connection between 
the two. The reference can be right or wrong, the description 
can be adequate or indadequate, fitting or unfitting. The 
statement tells something about whom or what the referring 
part refers to, and the descriptive part does or does not fit.
What can this be? Is there something in the world that 
could make a statement true or false? It is certainly not a 
person or a thing or an event to which a statement is ade­
quate. For instance, it is not a cat in the world that makes 
the statement ‘The cat is mangy" true, but the state of the 
cat expressed by the statement, i.e. the fact that the cat is 
mangy. A fact, however does not exclusively belong to the 
world, while an event, a thing or a person is a part of the 
world. But a fact is not merely a linguistic entity either.
A fact is a common product of the world and the language, or 
to put it otherwise, a fact is reality fixed by descriptive 
statements. To illustrate this, take a recent theory that 
provides an explanation of a state of affairs that occurred 
some hundred years ago or even earlier. For example, a cal­
culation is now made of the orbit of a planet as it was a 
hundred years ago, together with the changes this orbit has 
undergone since then. It is obvious that, in some way, this 
fact must have already existed a hundred years ago, although 
at that time the recent explanatory theory had not come into
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being yet. Therefore, more precisely, it was not the fact 
that existed then but a physical event belonging to the world, 
because this fact had not yet been separated from the natural 
process of events. The event only became a fact when it was 
put on a linguistic-logical record by the theoretical expla­
nation.
A statement, on the one hand, states something about the 
things, events and persons belonging to the world, and, on 
the other, asserts facts. A fact belongs to a statement as to 
an undivided whole. That is to say, statements, if they are 
really true, assert facts, but they do not speak about facts. 
The events belonging to the world can be dated and localized, 
things and persons can also be at least localized. But the 
facts the statements - if they are true - assert can be nei­
ther dated nor localized. Whjch point of time or place would 
they belong to? Would they belong to the place and time of 
whom the statement was told by or to those of the event, 
thing or person referred to by it?
And what does a statement say according to which another 
statement is true? We have postulated that the term "true" 
refers to such statements that have both a descriptive and a 
referring part. The majority of statements is formulated in 
the object-language. In this sense, a statement about the 
truth of another statement does not satisfy the above men­
tioned requirements. It is an object-language requirement 
that a statement should contain a descriptive part, whereas 
a statement that states truth is a meta-language statement. 
Such a statement has a referring part, namely the statement 
which we declare to be true or false. But it has no descrip­
tive part. It has an evaluating part instead, which declares 
that the original statement faithfully describes its refer­
ence, that is to say, the corresponding fact. In other words, 
it ascertains that, from a cognitive point of view, the orig­
inal statement is informative and orientative.
It is at this point that the question of truth is con­
nected with the certainty of knowledge. It is a truism in the
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sociology of knowledge that people have always preferred 
those statements that were said, regarded and believed to be 
true. They preferred them, i.e. they attached certain values 
to them because those statements usually played a positive 
and orientative role in their way of life. They have mostly 
evaluated the achievements of knowledge according to how 
reliable their Informative and orientative functions were.
The reliability of a piece of knowledge means that the inten­
tional ends of human activity can be better achieved with 
their help than with less reliable ones. Ib there any differ­
ence between the statements that are believed to be true and 
those that are really true? Let us make a simple experiment. 
Someone should be asked to write down on two different sheets 
of paper those statements that he regards to be true and 
those that he firmly believes in, so that the two groups 
mutually exclude each other. Such a classification is not 
contradictory in itself, still it cannot be reasonably car­
ried out by the experimentee. For very probably there will be 
a number of true statements among those he does not believe 
in, and a number of false statements among those he firmly 
believes. He can only accidentally accomplish his task if 
those statements that he believes in are all false, whereas 
those in the other group are all true. If we asked someone to 
list true and false statements, and if he acted reasonably, 
he would presumably list statements he does or does not be­
lieve. The fact that such a task can only be accidentally car­
ried out shows that, though the questions "to be true" and 
"to be regarded to be true" are logically independent of each 
other, the distinction practically has no significance, be­
cause there is no rational pattern according to which it could 
be carried out. From the point of view of the individual, the 
two questions cannot be separated, therefore, as far as the 
individual is concerned, the truth of a statement is reduced 
to belief in it.
A statement according to which another statement is true 
usually has to be grounded. The justification is usually done
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by one or more other statements. Is there among them a state­
ment about which we cannot reasonably ask why it is true or 
reliable? Even if we came across statements that do not re­
quire any further proof - let us call them statements of ulti­
mate evidence -, it would still be questionable whether they 
would make the whole of human knowledge more certain. My o- 
pinion is that knowledge would only be more certain if those 
evidence statements somehow served as a foundation of all 
further knowledge. If not, then it would merely cause psy­
chological satisfaction to us that here or there we can ob­
tain a piece of certain knowledge, and therefore this might 
be possible on other occasions as well. It can be logically 
proved that these verificatory statements cannot establish 
the whole of our knowledge. The foundation of knowledge 
should rather be sought for in the general and perhaps formal 
structure of that procedure of human activity which is aimed 
at obtaining knowledge.
As an example, we can mention the difference between the 
truth of the statements stated in the course of scientific 
research and that of our everyday life. The most important 
difference is that in our everyday life the correct use of 
language would usually suffice to consider a statement to be 
true. In science, however, the correct use of language in it­
self can hardly assure the truth of even the simplest state­
ments .
In everyday life, we usually accept a statement to be 
true if in the very same situation and language the others 
declare the same. The explanation of this phenomenon is that 
people in general learn their mother tongue in a situation 
where, for the sake of orientation or communication, they 
make identical or greatly similar statements.
The structure and the language of scientific activity 
is not independent of those of everyday life: the former makes 
use of, relies upon and can hardly exist without the latter.
In science, we cannot refer back to language as ultimate evi­
dence since there is no universal scientific language or ex-
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planation. As long as there exist complementary and often 
rival theories, the language of scientific description has to 
be grounded as well. It is not evident either that the lan­
guage of a certain scientific description is adequate to 
describe and explain the field of research. Therefore, in 
science, we cannot elude the question whether there is an es­
sential difference between the truth of and the belief in a 
certain statement.
In ordinary language there can also be a difference be­
tween these two, namely in the following two cases:
1. When the statements of ordinary language state some­
thing about which scientific statements also exist. It is a 
well-known sociological phenomenon that widely circulated 
scientific statements often get deformed and cause misunder­
standing in the course of everyday life. In everyday thinking, 
scientific statements are usually contrasted to two kinds of 
statements: one that relies on 'common sense* and another 
based on earlier scientific achievements that have already 
filtered into everyday thinking. He can ask anybody to decide 
whether natural numbers or even numbers are more numerous. In 
most cases, the answer will be that there are more natural 
numbers because they include both even and odd numbers. Being 
aware of the scientific answer some people will give a dif­
ferent reply. And there will also be some others who, without 
knowing what science says in this question, will give an ap­
proximately correct answer, for example, that both groups are 
Infinite in muber therefore neither of them can be enumerated. 
The scientific answer, however, is not that they cannot be 
enumerated, but that in the case of an infinite set another 
kind of calculation is needed than in the case of a finite 
set. To make this new kind of operation possible an infinite 
set is defined by science as that which contains a proper sub­
set of the same cardinal number. Therefore, in the case of 
ordinary language, the discrepancy between the acceptance and 
the objective truth of a statement is the outcome of the dif­
ference in the competence, information and knowledge different
people have.
2. A characteristically everyday statement Is, however, 
another case. For example, somebody claims that in the pub 
John slapped Peter in the face, someone else denies this 
claim, and possibly there will be some people who believe 
the latter. Suppose John has really slapped Peter in the 
face. Even if the above statements are made exactly where the 
event itself took place, the difference is still possible.
In this case, however, if somebody knows the sentences of 
everyday language and can correctly use and understand them, 
a reference to the rules of language can sufficiently prove 
the statement. But if the two different statements are made 
somewhere else, then our belief in them does not concern the 
relationship between the questionable event and the state­
ments relating it. It rather concerns which person we be­
lieve. And this will determine what we believe. So the truth 
of the statement and our belief in it are traced back to in­
terpersonal relationships. As far as characteristically every­
day statements are concerned, the discrepancy between the ac­
ceptance and the truth of a statement is not justified because 
in this field there is no difference between the competence 
of different people.
Here we cannot go into details concerning the relation­
ship of truth and the belief in truth in the sphere of scien­
tific theories. There is only one single point about scien­
tific theories which I would like to make. To declare a sci­
entific statement to be true there has to be an agreement 
based on certain principles. Scientists who accept a theory 
and keep the rules of the game which the very same theory 
requires believe the statements of the theoretical system to 
be true, and therefore there is no discrepancy between the 
truth of a statement and the belief in it. In Thomas Kuhn's 
analysis of scientific progress, the phase when an old theory 
is rejected or substituted by a new theory incompatible with 
the old one has been called scientific revolution or change
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of paradigm. Throughout the progress of science such moments 
occur very rarely because scientific work has got its so- 
called "normal" phases and the basic research is dominated by 
these. In the normal phase the current theory is usually not 
tested; it is accepted by the scientists as the rules of the 
game. During his research the scientist has to solve some 
puzzle or problem, and it is assured by the current theory 
that the problem can be solved. The difficulty of solving the 
problem is the difficulty of the scientist and not the theory. 
In empirical sciences tests are of course frequently made, 
but it is usually the scientist who is checked and not the 
current theory. To keep the rules of the game means that the 
statements of the theory are or are not regarded to be true 
according to the rules of the game which are valid within the 
frame of the theory. Therefore, the scientists who accept 
these rules cannot separate the truth of a certain statement 
from the question whether the other scientists in his group 
believe the same statement to be true. Since current theories 
always exist, if scientists agree on something within a theory, 
that is, believe it to be true, then usually it will really 
be true. This fact needs no explanation. Explanation would 
only be needed if it were not so. As far as science is con­
cerned, interpersonal agreement is a necessary condition of 
the truth of a certain statement.
I do not want to say that everything the scientists agree 
upon at a certain point of time is true, for in every theory 
there are shortlived hypotheses which are born to be soon re­
jected by the majority of even those scientists who formerly 
agreed upon it. But we cannot use this fact to deny that true 
statements are usually believed to be true and are also agreed 
upon, because without such a coincidence no language of fact 
would be possible in science.
Let us now return to the problem of certainty. When the 
grounds of some branch of science are sought for, the question 
usually is whether this branch of science has got a background 
that could assure the certainty of that particular field of
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knowledge. From a philosophical point of view this background 
is epistemological, but in fact a number of scientists search 
for a solid basis within their own branch of science. In the 
western world mathematics has always been the basic example 
of reliable knowledge. The analysis of reliable knowledge has 
always rested on the supposition that there is at least one 
kind of reliable knowledge, mathematics. As far as certainty 
is concerned, all the other types of knowledge have been com­
pared to mathematics as the ideal.
In my opinion, if there is anything that could make know­
ledge “certain", this cannot be a special kind of knowledge 
but a more general epistemological background. But then we 
have to point out at least some non-mathematical types of 
knowledge that can be accepted as reliable.
Learning always takes place against a special background. 
Let us call this background a world picture. I do not shape 
my picture of the world by assuring myself of its correctness, 
for this is a typical specimen of such a socially inherited 
background, in the light of which I distinguish between true 
and false.
To consider a statement verifiable means that it is 
considered to be deduced from another statement, which thus 
provides a ground of verification. But in principle this other 
statement, the ground of verification might also be considered 
as needing verification, and so forth. So if I do not want to 
fall into an infinite regress in the search for a foundation 
I must stop somewhere. But who will establish the criteria of 
accepting a statement as the final foundation? Within the 
realm of knowledge there is no such criterion. Therefore we 
have to say that this final foundation cannot be another 
statement. This foundation is an ungrounded way of action.
If a child is told that a good many years ago Mont Blanc 
was amassed by someone, the child will believe it. Later, of 
course, he will learn that there are reliable and unreliable 
informants, but he will only learn this much after he has 
already learned a number of facts told by different, more or
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less trustworthy informants. At the beginning, a child has 
no doubts. When I stand on my feet, why do I not check wheth­
er I have two feet at all? There is no why. I simply do not. 
This is how I act.
In certain situations one cannot make a mistake. In order 
to make a mistake, one must first make a judgement of some­
thing in conformity with mankind. When a child learns, he 
believes what the grown-ups say and his doubts come only after 
believing. Reasonable beings do not have certain kinds of 
doubts. We cannot doubt everything. That we do not doubt 
everything is simply the way we judge things and the way we 
usually act. This is because the fact that normally I have 
two hands is just as sure as anything else by which I could 
prove it. It is not only I who believes that I have two hands 
but any 'reasonable* being acts on the supposition that nor­
mally every human being has two hands. A child learns with 
the same inexorability that ’this is a hand* as that ‘twice 
two is four*. All these are fundamental in our life and there­
fore we cannot change our opinion about them. Precisely that 
is why they are fundamental.
About the certainty of mathematical knowledge we can say 
the following: If I have learned how to multiply I can do the 
same multiplication twice, so that I should not make a mis­
take; but will the result be more reliable if I repeat the 
operation, say, twenty more times? Calculation is an important 
part of our activities, and in the course of our life we make 
use of it day by day. If we repeat a certain calculation, it 
is always a pattern of calculation that we accomplish and by 
way of repetition we can check only the calculation and not 
the pattern. We expect that a certain multiplication should 
have the same result in each case, but our expectation con­
cerns the pattern of calculation and not the concrete opera­
tion. We expect the reliability of the pattern for sure. And 
uhat we expect for sure is essential from the point of view 
of our whole life.
Ill
My argumentation does not deny, and does not declare to 
be wrong, the experience which aims at giving a final founda­
tion to scientific statements within the realm of science on 
the basis of another kind, and in some way deeper, knowledge. 
No contradiction or vicious circle can be attributed - though 
there are a number of technical difficulties -, say, to the 
reduction of arithmetic to set theory. We just cannot accept 
this as a foundation, simply because as far as the certainty 
of knowledge is concerned, it does not serve with any surplus. 
It number theory is questionable, then so is set theory. As 
far as the certainty of knowledge is concerned, number theory 
is no less fundamental than set theory.
Though we do not find the tracing back of knowledge and 
the statements which make up knowledge to a final foundation 
effective, it might seem that, since we have declared some 
statements to be unquestionable, we also seek for a founda­
tion. We do not seek for a foundation in the sense as if cer­
tain types of knowledge could be traced back to such a founda­
tion or in the sense as if the certainty of knowledge could 
be proved by knowledge itself either. On the other hand, we 
have indicated certain philosophical-epistemological con­
siderations, which suggest that it is a basis and a part of 
human life and human activities that certain statements are 
believed to be solid. We regard these statements as solid, 
though from a scientific or a logical point of view they are 
not any more solid than the others. This means that even 
those statements which can be considered to be firm have a 
logical alternative, that is, they could be, or at least could 
be imagined to be otherwise. But to question these fundamental 
statements would be much more dangerous for our life - in­
cluding scientific activities as well - than to regard them 
as firm, as indisputable.
Our final conclusion is quite trivial and perhaps not 
too significant. In case the truth of our statements needs to 
be grounded in the sense that the foundations are expected to 
stake this truth certain, these foundations cannot be true or
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false any more, because then they would need to be grounded 
as well. If there are such foundations, or If they are needed 
at all, we can find then only outside the sphere of knowledge.
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